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Problem Description
The LHC, the world’s largest particle accelerator currently under construction at CERN, has large
number of magnets, both superconducting and normal conducting installed to guide the two
proton beams around the accelerator. The Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor (FMCM) has been
designed to provide a fast and reliable trigger signal, for dumping the beams in the case of
powering failures of magnets which have fast effects on the beam trajectories.
For remote monitoring and Post Mortem analysis every FMCM is connected to the CERN control
system by means of an RS-422 interface. This master's thesis is focusing on the software
development of the control interface for the described FMCM units. The FMCM control interface
will be responsible for the communication between the different FMCMs and CERN’s control
system, to collect data acquired by each FMCM and to provide a tool for the machine operators to
supervise the device. The project also includes the analysis of the currently implemented RS-422
interface in terms of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Signal Integrity (SI) and reliability.
Together with integration and configuration of the RS-422 interface into the VME framework (using
CERN standards for hardware and configuration tools) and validation of the communication in
terms of the initial requirements for speed based on a representative test-setup.
Assignment given: 04. September 2006
Supervisor: Nils Holte, IET

Abstract
A large number of magnets, both superconducting and normal conducting, are in-
stalled for the guidance of the two proton beams around the Large Hadron Collider
(LHC), the world’s largest particle accelerator currently under construction at the
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). Due to the unprecedented
energies stored in the beams and the magnets, sophisticated systems are under de-
velopment to protect the equipment in case of failure. However, scenarios have been
identified where failures in the magnet powering will lead to very fast beam losses
in less than 100 µs, due to the low time constants of the electrical circuits and
the consequent fast current decay. For these circuits, systems that are currently de-
ployed will not be fast enough to generate and transmit a beam dump request before
the magnetic field change affects the beam trajectory. A dedicated system for the
detection of such fast failures is already operational at the Hadron-Electron Ring
Accelerator (HERA) in Hamburg. This system, the Fast Magnet Current Change
Monitor (FMCM), has been adapted to meet CERN requirements and needs to be
integrated into the CERN accelerator environment.
For remote monitoring and Post Mortem analysis every FMCM is connected to the
CERN control system by means of an RS-422 interface. This master’s thesis is
focused on the software development and analysis of the control interface for the
described FMCM units. The communication between the FMCMs and the CERN
control system has been designed and implemented in C++, following the guidelines
given by the Front End Software Architecture (FESA) framework. An analysis of the
RS-422 interface with respect to Signal Integrity and Electromagnetic Compatibility
verified the current setup of the RS-422 serial interface for the given transmission
parameters. Transient bursts are considered to be the most common type of dis-
turbance in the LHC and the related surface buildings. Hence, error detection has
been implemented to ensure reliable communication by causing retransmissions of
the data until it has been correctly received.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Once in operation, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) currently under construction
at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) will be the largest and
one of the most complex scientific instruments every built. Two counter rotating
proton beams will be accelerated to 7 TeV and collided in 4 large underground exper-
iments to find further answers to fundamental questions in particle physics. Particle
accelerators such as the LHC require a large number of magnets, both supercon-
ducting and normal conducting for the guidance of the two proton beams around
the 27 km long circular tunnel. Due to the unprecedented stored energies, 360 MJ
in each of the two proton beams and 10 GJ in the magnet system, sophisticated
systems have to be developed to protect the equipment from any damage in the
case of equipment failures. Especially for the normal conducting magnets installed
in high radiation areas, the decay time of the magnetic field in case of powering
failures is very small resulting in a large deviation of the proton beams, in some
cases within less than 100 µs. For these circuits, the protection systems currently
deployed will not be fast enough to request the removal of the proton beams from the
machine before the magnetic field change affects the beam trajectories. A dedicated
system for the detection of such fast failures has been developed and put into oper-
ation in the Hadron-Electron Ring Accelerator (HERA) in Hamburg. This system,
the Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor (FMCM), has recently been adapted to
meet CERN requirements and needs to be integrated into the CERN accelerator
environment.
Due to the geographical distribution of installations in CERN’s accelerator complex
and for personnel safety the equipment will not be accessible during machine oper-
ation. To allow for remote monitoring and read out of Post Mortem data after an
event, every FMCM is connected to the CERN control system by means of an RS-422
interface. This master’s thesis is focusing on the software development of the control
interface for the described FMCM units. The project also includes the analysis of
the currently implemented RS-422 protocol in terms of Electromagnetic Compati-
bility (EMC), Signal Integrity (SI) and reliability. Together with integration and
configuration of the RS-422 interface into the VME framework (using CERN stan-
dards for hardware and configuration tools) and validation of the communication in
terms of the initial requirements for speed based on a representative test-setup.
Part 1 of this report describes the background and context for this thesis and ex-
plains the main motivations for the development of the FMCM. Chapter 1 is an
1
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introduction to CERN and the LHC in general, with facts and figures of the chal-
lenges involved in such a large project. Chapter 2 is an introduction to the FMCM
and its role within the Machine Protection System.
Part 2 contains the preliminary study of the FMCM control interface, design and
implementation. Chapter 3 includes the system specifications and functional re-
quirements, and a description of the resulting design and the implementation of the
front end computer software. Chapter 4 includes a general discussion of error han-
dling in serial communication as well as a description of the error handling methods
applied to the FMCM control interface.
Part 3 discusses the different tests and analysis of the control interface in general and
the RS-422 interface in particular. Chapter 5 describes the background and purpose
of the different tests as well as how they were carried out. Chapter 6 presents the
obtained results with discussions comparing the results to the initial requirements.
Finally, Chapter 7 is a summary of the conclusions drawn from the different results.
Part I
Background & Context
3

Chapter 2
CERN and the LHC
CERN officially came into being in 1954 as one of the first joint ventures in Europe
with the following mandate:
“The Organization shall provide for collaboration among European
States in nuclear research of a pure scientific and fundamental character,
and in research essentially related thereto. The Organization shall have
no concern with work for military requirements and the results of its
experimental and theoretical work shall be published or otherwise made
generally available.” [1]
The name CERN is derived from the French term Conseil Europe´en pour la Recherche
Nucle´aire, or European Council for Nuclear Research which was a temporary name
and later changed to European Organization for Nuclear Research. However, to-
day 50 years later, CERN is usually referred to as European laboratory for particle
physics as the work of the physicians long time ago went beyond the study of the
atomic nucleus. Today one talks about high energy physics. The main historical
events at CERN are listed in Table 2.1. CERN is run by the 20 European member
states, but also non-European countries make significant contributions. The main
function of CERN is to provide particle accelerators and other infrastructure which
1949 Louis de Broglie proposes the creation of a European science laboratory
1954 The foundation of CERN
1957 600 MeV Synchrocyclotron commissioned
1959 28 GeV Proton Synchrotron (PS) commissioned
1963 Bubble Chambers give first evidence of neutrino interaction
1973 Neutral Currents discovery ratified
1976 Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) commissioned
1984 Noble Prize awarded to C. Rubia ans S van der Meer for W and Z
1989 Large Electron Positron (LEP) commissioned
1990 T. Berners-Lee propose the World Wide Web (www)
1992 Nobel Prize awarded to G. Charpak for Multi-Wire Chambers
2006 CERN Neutrinos to Gran Sasso Project (CNGS) begins
2007 First commissioning with beam scheduled for the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)
Table 2.1: A brief history of CERN [2]
5
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1982 First studies for the LHC project
1994 Approval of the LHC by the CERN Council
1996 Final decision to start the LHC construction
1996 LEP operation at 100 GeV (W-factory)
2000 End of LEP operation
2002 LEP equipment removed
2003 Start of the LHC installation
2006 Start of hardware commissioning
2007 Commissioning with beam
Table 2.2: History of CERN related to the LHC Project [4]
international collaborations use for research in high energy physics. Several impor-
tant achievements in particle physics are derived from experiments at CERN, and
not all of them are mentioned in Table 2.1. These days most of the activities at
CERN are directed toward building a new accelerator, the LHC.
2.1 The LHC
Once put into operation the LHC (see Figure 2.1) will be the world’s largest scientific
instrument and the most powerful particle accelerator ever build. The motivation
behind the LHC is to find answers to some fundamental questions in particle physics.
The current understanding of particles and mass relies on a model which implies the
existence of a Higgs boson. However, to detect the Higgs boson energy in the TeV
range is required, which is what the LHC will provide. The LHC is being build in the
Figure 2.1: The Large Hadron Collider
already existing infrastructure of the Large Electron-Positron storage ring (LEP)[3],
a 27 km long circular tunnel underground. The LEP experiments were finished in
2000 and the first LHC installations were done in 2003. The first commissioning
with beam in the LHC is intended for 2007, 25 years after the first initial studies of
the LHC, see Table 2.2.
In the LEP experiments electrons and positrons were accelerated and made to col-
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lide. Before the LEP was dismantled in 2000 it was able to accelerate the particles to
104 GeV/c. In the LHC experiments protons or heavy ions will be injected into the
LHC machine at 450 GeV/c and accelerated to 7 TeV/c in approximately 30 min-
utes. There will be two beams, one in each direction and the two beams will collide
at four intersections where large detectors are located. The LHC has an eight-fold
symmetry with eight arc sections and eight straight sections. The detectors and the
machine operation systems are placed in the straight sections, see Figure 2.2. The
Figure 2.2: Schematic layout of the LHC
four detectors belong to four different experiments: ALICE (A Large Ion Collider
Experiment), ATLAS (A Toroidal LHC Apparatus), CMS (The Compact Muon
Solenoid experiment) and LHC-b (The Large Hadron Collider beauty experiment).
The researchers at ALICE will study quark-gluon plasma, a phase of matter that
existed for just a fraction of seconds after the Big Bang. At LHC-b they will study
particles containing beauty and anti-beauty quarks to understand the assumed un-
balance between matter and anti-matter in the universe. The CMS is a general
purpose detector for experimental physics dedicated to proton collisions. ATLAS is
the main detector for head-on collisions of protons, and where one would expect to
find proof of the existence of the Higgs boson. The four remaining straight sections
are dedicated to systems for machine operation: Beam Cleaning, Beam Dump and
Radio Frequency (RF) acceleration.
To prepare the particle beams that are injected into the LHC a series of accelera-
tors are used: The Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS), the Proton Synchrotron (PS)
and the Proton Synchrotron Booster (PSB). The Low Energy Ion Ring (LEIR) is
not an accelerator but an accumulator and is only used for experiments with ion
collisions. The other accelerators however, always take part in the pre-acceleration
of the particles before they are injected into the LHC, see Figure 2.3. The SPS
injects the particle beams into the LHC through the transfer lines connecting the
two accelerators.
The fundamentals of particle accelerator theory is based on the Lorentz equation,
which states that the force on a particle in an electromagnetic field is given by the
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Figure 2.3: The CERN Accelerator complex
cross-product of the particle velocity ~v and the magnetic field ~B plus the electrical
field ~E, multiplied with the particle charge q :
~F = q
(
~E + ~v × ~B
)
(2.1)
Thus a positively charged particle will be accelerated in the same linear orientation
as the electrical field, but will be deflected perpendicularly to the magnetic field
according to the right-hand rule. In the LHC two types of magnets are needed for
basic particle steering. That is dipole magnets for deflection and quadrupole magnets
for focalization of the beam. The quadrupole magnets focus the beam similar to
lenses used in light optics in the sense that it focalizes the beam in one plane but
defocalizes it in the other plane. Thus, to focus the beam in both planes one needs
a pair of quadrupoles with alternating optical functions. The particle acceleration,
in sense of increase of energy, takes place in the RF cavity. A time-varying electrical
field accelerates charged particles in bunches. A bunch consists of up to 1.15× 1011
particles which enter the cavity just at the right time, or equivalently with the right
phase. A particle entering out of phase will be decelerated and lost.
The magnets to guide the particle beams in the LHC will be both superconducting
and normal conducting. In circular accelerators the particles pass through the RF
cavity once during every turn, and are accelerated at every passage. The LHC RF
cavity operates at 400 MHZ and as already mentioned after 30 minutes of accelera-
tion the particles reach 7 TeV/c. The angle of particle deflection is proportional to
the magnetic field divided by the momentum, and as the momentum increases one
must increase the magnetic field to maintain the same angle of deflection throughout
acceleration. This is why superconducting magnets are needed as they can reach
the target magnetic field of 8.33 Tesla and keep the particle in their orbit. Normal
conducting magnets are limited to 1-2 Tesla. However, the normal conducting mag-
nets are more resistant to radiation and are therefore used close to the detectors
and in other parts of the machine where the radiation is too high for the use of
superconducting magnets.
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2.2 LHC Parameters and Challenges
The design and realization of the LHC has required engineers from several fields to
deliver solutions that represent the cutting edge of accelerator technology. The main
LHC parameters are summarized in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.
Momentum at collision 7 TeV/c
Injection energy 0.45 TeV/c
Number of dipole magnets 1232
Number of quadrupole magnets 430
Number of corrector magnets about 8000
Particles per bunch 1.15× 1011
Number of bunches per beam 2808
Bunch spacing 25 ns
Beam pipe diameter 56 mm
Typical rms beam size in arcs at 7 TeV 200-300 µm
Table 2.3: Some machine parameters [4]
Energy stored in magnet system 10 GJ
Energy stored in one dipole circuit 1.1 GJ
Energy stored in one beam 362 MJ
Average power over a fill of 10 hours, both beams 20 kW
Beam power averaged over one turn, one beam 3.9 TW
World Net Electricity Generation (2002) 1.7 TW
Energy needed to heat and melt 1 kg copper 700 kJ
Table 2.4: Energy stored in magnets and beams [5]
The LHC has 1232 superconducting dipole magnets with niobium-titanium coils
and the superconducting magnets are maintained at only 1.9 K (about -271◦C).
The magnets are cooled by super-fluid helium which is provided by a large and com-
plex cryogenic system. Each sector of the LHC is served by one of the four cryogenic
plants through a 3.3 km cryogenic distribution line. The sectors are further divided
into cells, where cryogenic loops extends a long a lattice cell of 107 m, supplying
the magnets in one cell. Contrary to electron-positron or proton antiproton col-
liders, the two counter-rotating proton beams in the LHC need opposite deflecting
magnetic fields in the arcs. A major feature of the LHC dipoles is their two-in-one
design, providing opposite magnetic fields for the two counter-rotating beams within
a single structure. Four vacuum systems are needed, one for each beam, one insu-
lation vacuum system for the magnets and one insulation vacuum for the cryogenic
distribution line. Along the arc, there will be several thousand crates with radiation
tolerant electronics for quench protection, orbit corrector power converters, instru-
mentation for the beams and the vacuum and cryogenic system. A quench is what
happens when a superconducting magnet looses it superconductivity and becomes
resistive. There are several mechanisms that can lead to a quench like beam loss,
movement of the superconductor by several µm (friction and heat dissipation) or
a failure in the cryogenic system. In each case, the temperature of the magnet is
rising. Feeding current into magnets that operate at 1.9 K is an other issue, and
has led to new technology like industrial use of High Temperature Superconducting
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material [4].
Figure 2.4: A dipole magnet about to be installed in the LHC
The energy stored in each dipole magnet is 7.6 MJ, and the energy stored in the
entire magnet system is 10 GJ. For comparison this is equivalent to 230 kg of gasoline
and with such an amount of energy one could melt nearly 15 tons of copper [5].
In order to handle the energy stored in the magnet system, the LHC magnets are
powered in several independent powering sub-sectors. This reduces the energy stored
in the individual circuits, and reduces the complexity of the protection systems of
the superconducting magnets which are then similar to equivalent systems in other
accelerators (HERA, TEVATRON, RHIC), see Figure 2.5. The proton momentum
before collison is 7 TeV/c which is a factor of seven to sixteen above accelerators such
as SPS, TEVATRON and HERA. However, the energy stored in one beam is 362
MJ and is larger by a factor of 200 due to the high beam intensity. The maximum
energy density, which is important when it comes to equipment damage, is a factor
of 1000 higher than in other accelerators. This is due to the small beam dimensions.
An uncontrolled loss of even a very small fraction of the 7 TeV proton beam could
cause significant equipment damage. Even the beam injected from the SPS into the
LHC at 450 GeV can damage the equipment and it is therefore necessary that the
protection is efficient through the whole cycle of machine operation [5]. The risk
related to storing such a large amount of energy has been minimized by advanced
protection systems such as the Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor. These systems
will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
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Figure 2.5: Stored Energy in the LHC and other accelerators [6, 7]

Chapter 3
The LHC Machine Protection
System
The LHC will collide two counter-rotating proton beams, each with a momentum of 7
TeV/c. Uncontrolled beam loss could cause significant equipment damage and accel-
erator downtime and safe operation of the LHC will rely on the Machine Protection
System (MPS).
3.1 General Introduction to the MPS
The general requirements for the LHC protection systems are the following:“
• Protect the accelerator equipment: The first priority is to protect equipment
from damage, in the LHC ring and during the transfer from the pre-accelerator
SPS to the LHC. The second priority is to protect superconducting magnets
from quenching.
• Protect the beam: Protection systems should only dump the particle beams
when necessary. “False” beam dumps should be avoided in order not to com-
promise availability.
• Provide the evidence: In case of failure, complete and coherent diagnostics
data should be provided to accurately understand what caused failure and if
the protection systems functioned correctly. [5]”
The Machine Protection System is a collection of systems that interact to ensure safe
operation of the LHC. The different elements are shown in Figure 3.1. The strategy
behind the design of the MPS is to detect failures in accelerator equipment early
and dump the beam before it is affected. Also, active beam monitors will detect
if there are abnormalities in the beam parameters and if so request a beam dump
within a very short time. Reliable and fast transmission of the beam dump requests
from the various systems are ensured by the Beam Interlock System. The MPS is
mostly redundant as in most cases a failure may be captured by more than a single
system though with different time-scales and different effects [5]. The most relevant
parts of the MPS are briefly described in the following sections.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Machine Protection System [6]
The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS)
The Beam Dumping System dumps the beam into a 10 meter long graphite block
that absorbs the beam energy without any significant damage. This is the only part
of the LHC machine that can withstand the impact of a full LHC beam. The LBDS
will perform a beam dump when receiving a signal either from the Beam Interlock
controller, the access system (if personnel are entering potentially dangerous parts
of the accelerator complex) or a dedicated Beam Loss Monitor (BLM) close to the
extraction line. The LBDS can also trigger a beam dump by it self if there is an
internal failure. [6, 4, 5]
The Beam Interlock System (BIS)
The Beam Interlock System collects beam dump requests from the various user sys-
tems distributed around the LHC and transmits such requests to the Beam Dumping
System. Due to the possibility of fast beam losses, the system must transmit dump
requests from connected systems around the LHC to the Beam Dumping System
within less than approximately 100 µs.[6, 5, 8]
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The Beam Loss Monitor System (BLMS)
“The Beam Loss Monitor System consists of several thousand ionisation chambers
located along-side the beam pipe in the SPS, LHC and transfer lines. When particles
escape from the accelerator they are detected by these chambers and if the number
of lost particles is above a certain threshold then a beam dump is requested.”[6]
Safe Machine Parameters (SMP)
The Safe Machine Parameters (SMP) System generates and distributes machine pa-
rameters that are critical for LHC beam operation, such as beam energy and inten-
sity, to equipment using this information for protection. Safe Machine Parameters
are sent through the CERN General Machine Timing (GMT) system. [6, 5]
Beam Absorbers and Collimators
Beam absorbers and collimators are large movable carbon or metal jaws which can be
positioned very close to the beam orbit, capturing any particles with large amplitudes
which would otherwise be lost in the accelerator. [6, 5]
Normal and Superconductive Magnet Powering Interlocks
The normal conducting magnets in the LHC are protected by Warm magnet In-
terlock Controllers (WIC). The WIC is based on temperature sensors which detect
temperatures above a certain threshold in the magnets. These sensors are connected
to industrial controllers that will switch off the power converters in case of failure.
A beam dump request is then transmitted via the Beam Interlock System.
The superconducting magnets are protected by two systems, the Quench Protection
System (QPS) and Powering Interlock Controllers (PIC). In the case of a quench the
QPS will initialize the discharge of energy stored in the quenched magnet and send
a request to the PIC to switch off the corresponding power converters. In case of
a quench or another powering failure, the PIC sends signals to the Beam Interlock
System which will request a beam dump before the decaying magnetic field can
affect the beam orbit. [6]
3.2 The Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor (FMCM)
The FMCM is an important protection device in the Machine Protection System.
A beam incident in the TT40 extraction line of the SPS (destroying several vacuum
chambers and a quadrupole magnet) showed the necessity of an additional protective
device. The main task of the FMCM is to monitor fast current changes in normal
conducting magnets in critical parts of the LHC and its transfer lines. A fast current
change can be caused by sudden powering failures and implies a change in the
magnetic field which changes the particle trajectory leading to fast beam losses.
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When the FMCM detects such a fast current change it will send a beam dump
request to the Beam Interlock System.
The FMCM was initially developed at DESY for the HERA storage ring to protect
the machine from beam induced damage in case of sudden power supply failures.
It has been adapted to meet CERN requirements and several units have already
been successfully operated during the commissioning and initial operation of CERN
Neutrinos to Grand Sasso (CNGS).
The difference between the FMCM and other systems protecting the normal con-
ducting magnets is the FMCMs capability of detecting current changes in the range
of 10E-4 within less than 1 ms. Detection of slow changes in the absolute value of
the current is assured by other systems [9].
Figure 3.2: The Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor
3.2.1 Introduction to the Studies Leading to the Development of
the FMCM
Failures in the powering system of the LHC magnets are generally relatively slow
events due to the large inductance of superconducting magnets. The natural time
constant of the electrical circuits are in the order of a few seconds for the normal
conducting magnets and up to some minutes for the super conducting magnets.
Beam loss monitors will normally detect the corresponding beam losses and trigger
a beam dump. However, power failure in combination with normal conducting
magnets can lead to very fast decaying magnetic fields, for which the response time
of the Beam Loss Monitor is too slow. The number of particles lost in the collimators
and the accelerator equipment will reach damage level before the beam has been
safely extracted from the accelerator. In case of power converter failure the error
magnet field behaves according to:
∆Berror(t) = B0(1− exp− tτ ) (3.1)
where τ = L/R is the decay time constant determined by the circuits inductance
and resistance. By modeling the accelerator as a cascade of lenses, and applying laws
from optical physics one can simulate the trajectory of one particle as it turns in the
accelerator. Combining this with Equation 3.1 and knowing that the particles in one
bunch are generally gaussian distributed, one can find the number of particles which
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are extracted by the collimators after powering failure of the corresponding magnet.
Figure 3.3, shows the result of a simulation following this model [10]. These studies
Figure 3.3: Total number of particles lost at collimator as a function of the number
of turns the beam have made after the occurrence of a sudden power failure. The
horizontal red line represents the damage level of the collimator. In the green plot
to the right, the natural time constant of the circuit has been doubled compared to
the red plot to the left. This illustrates how sensitive the collimators are for fast
powering failures of normal conducting magnets. [10]
made clear that the Beam Loss Monitor was not suitable to act on such fast powering
failures, and other concepts were studied as well [11] before the final decision was to
further develop the FMCM designed at DESY.
3.2.2 Short Functional Description
Figure 3.4: The working principle of the FMCM [9]
The FMCM measures the voltage across the magnet or circuit with an external
voltage divider and an isolated amplifier. It then performs a real-time calculation of
the magnet current using a low pass filter. Next, the signal passes a high pass filter
to amplify the fast current changes which typically happen during a power converter
failure. The resulting signal is fed to a comparator which decides whether or not the
fast current changes are inside a tolerance window. The tolerance window is set by
a potentiometer on the front panel of the FMCM. If the signal exceeds the tolerance
window, a signal is sent to the Beam Interlock System and Post Mortem (PM) data
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is stored for later analysis, see Figure 3.4. The acquisition of PM data is described
in Section 4.1.1.[12]
The LHC is a slow cycling machine with a long filling process and operational cycle,
see Figure 3.5. The time interval between two injections is approximately 20 seconds,
depending on the cycle-time of the pre-injections, see Figure 3.6. Thus, there are
slow ramping magnets in the LHC and fast ramping magnets in the SPS and transfer
lines. This leads to two different configurations for the FMCM, especially for the
comparator and read out of PM data. The signal to the Beam Interlock System is
different in the transfer lines and the LHC. In the transfer lines the FMCM gives
the BIC an extraction permit when the magnets are ready. Thus the signal is “low”
most of the time and then going “high”, when the permit is given (maximum every
20 seconds). In the LHC the FMCM gives the BIC a beam permit, which is “high”
in normal operation an only changes to “low” when there is an event and the beams
need to be dumped.
Figure 3.5: The LHC cycle
Figure 3.6: A typical SPS cycle with a LHC injection followed by CNGS injections.
Part II
Study & Implementation
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Chapter 4
The FMCM Control Interface
This chapter describes how the third requirement of the LHC Machine Protection
System, see Section 3.1, will be achieved for the FMCM. That is, how to provide
the evidence after a failure. The FMCM control interface is responsible for the
communication between the different FMCMs and the CERN control system, to
collect data acquired by the FMCM and to provide a tool for the machine operators
to supervise the device. The control interface of the FMCM can also be said to
contribute to the protection of accelerator equipment as the parameters retrieved
from the FMCM can be used by diagnostic tools for surveillance and operational
control of the LHC. Remote surveillance of the different protection systems makes
it possible to analyze events and understand less critical failures without having to
stop the accelerator.
4.1 System Specification and Requirements
This section is based on the functional specification of the FMCM [12].
This master thesis is focused on the development of the software for the control
interface as the hardware has already been defined. However, tests will be done
to verify the installations of the hardware in sense of electromagnetic compatibility
and signal integrity, see Chapter 6. The choice of hardware has influence on the
software design, and there are certain guidelines in the LHC project for integration
of hardware that must be followed.
The FMCM is connected to a front end computer through a serial RS-422 interface.
The front end computer is the crate manager in a Versa Module Eurocard (VME)
crate, where several cards for different systems are installed. The front end computer
is the master and communicates with the other cards, called slaves, via the VME bus.
One of these slaves is the FMCM, although the FMCM is situated outside the crate
itself. As the FMCM uses the RS-422 protocol and the VME bus has a RS-232
interface, two intermediate modules are used to make a RS-422 interface on the
VME side of the connection. These two modules, the VME bus industrypack carrier
VIPC626-ET and the industrypack IP-OCTALPLUS422, are installed in the VME
crate and connected to the FMCM through a twisted pair cable. A short introduction
to the RS-422 standard, and a more detailed description of the installation of the
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serial interface on the VME side is given in Appendix A.
Figure 4.1 is an overview of the future installation of FMCMs in the LHC and the
transfer lines, and shows how the different units are connected to the higher level
modules of the control interface. There will be 26 FMCMs installed in the LHC and
the SPS-LHC transfer lines, and a maximum of four FMCMs will be connected to
the same front end computer. A further description of the installations concerning
hardware, cabling and connections to other systems is given in Appendix B.
The communication between the different FMCMs and the front end computers
will be realized by software implemented in the front end computer. The set of
commands and messages going over the RS-422 interface, and the rules for when
and how they will be transmitted is defined in the system specification, and most
of them are already implemented in the current prototype of the FMCM. One of
the restrictions given by the LHC project is that all front end computer software
shall be developed in the Front End Software Architecture (FESA) framework. The
purpose of the framework is to make consistent rules for how front end software
is implemented for equipment used by the Accelerator and Beams department at
CERN. An introduction to the FESA framework is given in Appendix C.
The front end computer will store the information retrieved from the different
FMCMs in a FESA server. This information can then be accessed by a Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The higher level development of
the control interface is outside the scope of this thesis, however the chosen imple-
mentation of the front end computer software will define the requirements and the
limitations for the SCADA application. This application will give the operators situ-
ated in the CERN Control Center (CCC) access to the acquired data and diagnostic
tools for analysis.
4.1.1 Data Acquisition and Signal Processing in the FMCM
The most important data acquired by the FMCM is the Post Mortem (PM) data,
which contains the voltage and current recordings of the protected magnet around
the time of failure. In case of an event (either self-triggered or triggered by the global
PM trigger distributed via the LHC timing system, see Section 4.1.2), the FMCM
will freeze the internal buffers with the PM data and register the PM acquisition
with a time-stamp. There are four different versions of the PM data available in the
FMCM:
• The measured magnet voltage: U Mag
• Simulated magnetic field changes: I Diff Sim
• Direct Current Current Transformer (DCCT) current changes: I Diff DCCT
• External Voltage: U Ext
The resolution of the analog to digital converter (ADC) is 12 bits per sample for
the mentioned signals, which requires 2 bytes of memory per sample. A data set is
decided to be 2000 samples per signal.
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12 bits 2 bits 1 bit 1 bit
Data Zeros Optical isolated trigger FMCM alarm output
Table 4.1: 1 sample of PM data
Two versions of the PM buffers will be implemented due to the different character-
istics of the magnets in the LHC and the transfer lines. The fast ramping magnets
in the transfer lines will be measured with the highest resolution (one sample every
21.33 µs), during a time window of 40 ms (30 ms before the event and 10 ms after
the event). For the slow ramping magnets in the LHC the recordings will be done
with a lower resolution (one sample every 42.66 µs) and a consequently longer time
window of 80 ms (60 ms before the event and 20 ms after the event).
To reach the desired number of particles in the LHC, the proton beams are injected
through the transfer lines in several steps (injection in so-called batches). The time
interval between two injections is approximately 20 seconds, depending on the cycle-
time of the pre-injections. In the worst case, this means that one may encounter new
events in the FMCM along the transfer lines every 20 second. In the LHC however,
being a slow cycling machine with a long filling process and operational cycle, things
are more stable and the interval between possible events is longer, see Figure 3.6
and Figure 3.5 for comparison. Every time a new event is registered, old PM data
will be lost. Thus, readout of PM data must be ensured within the interval between
consecutive events. To summarize, it is more time-critical to read out the PM data
from the FMCMs in the transfer lines than in the LHC.
The transmission time of a PM data set is expected to be about 1.2 seconds at a
transmission rate of 38.4 kbps (available in the current prototype of the FMCM).
The FMCM is decided to operate at 115.2 kbps, which allows for retransmission
of data in the event of transmission errors between the FMCM and the front end
computers. At the same time this transmission rate is expected to be low enough
to ensure reliable communication while transmitting over long cables.
The FMCM also keep records of important information about the current state of
the device. This information can be used for both diagnostic purposes and also to
detect a failure before it actually happens.
4.1.2 The FMCM Timing Interface
The purpose of the FMCM timing interface is to make the internal clock in the
FMCM synchronous with the LHC machine and the Universal Coordinated Time
(UTC). The FMCM will use the internal clock to time stamp any occurring events
and the PM data. For external events, that is events happening somewhere else
in the LHC, the FMCM will be notified by a timing signal (called the PM trigger)
coming from a CTRP (Control Timing Receiver PCI) card. Figure 4.2 shows the
three signals involved in the FMCM timing process.
Signals from the CTRP card:
• PM trigger: 1 negative pulse of 2 µs. The PM trigger signal indicates an
external event in the LHC machine. Such an event will require PM data to
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be sent from the FMCM to the VME front end computer, which again will
forward this data to the CERN control system.
• Pulse per second (pps): 1 Hz signal with accuracy in the range of some nanosec-
onds, which is used to synchronize the internal clock in the FMCM with the
LHC machine timing.
Signal from the front end computer:
• UTC time: A timing message of 32 bits, which indicates the absolute UTC
time with 1 second accuracy. This message is used to synchronize the internal
clock in the FMCM upon arrival of the next timing pulse (pps) to the specific
date and time (UTC).
Figure 4.2: The FMCM timing interface
A new prototype of the FMCM arrived at CERN in end of January 2007, and tests
were done to verify the behavior of the timing interface and to make an analysis of
the accuracy in reference to the PM time-stamp. A presentation of these tests and
the results are given in Appendix D.
4.1.3 The FMCM Control Interface and Network Architecture
Serial data communication is not strictly a network communication protocol, but the
design of the control interface can be compared to the Open Systems Interconnection
Basic Reference Model (OSI model) to show how the communication is implemented
in different layers [13].
Layer Function Data Unit
Application Layer SCADA Application Data
Transport Layer Front End Software Packets
Data Link Layer UART and driver Frames
Physical Layer RS-422 Bits
Table 4.2: The Network Architecture
As one can see in Figure 4.1, the distribution of FMCMs is more a communication
tree then a network. The different FMCMs can not communicate with each other
and in fact they are under the strict rule of their proper front end computer. A
FMCM can only send a message to its front end after the front end computer has
specifically ordered it to do so. The front end computer retrieves information from
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the FMCMs connected to it, stores the data in the FESA server, which again the
SCADA application can use to monitor the device. Thus, as there is no need to route
the messages, the network layer is extracted from the model. Also for simplicity,
the transport, the session layer and the presentation layer has been combined to one
single layer and called the transport layer.
The Physical Layer
The physical layer is concerned with transmitting raw bits over a communication
channel. It defines the mechanical, electrical and timing interface to the network.
The physical link chosen for the FMCM control interface is a shielded twisted pair
cable with a differential serial interface, namely RS-422. The RS-422 standard to-
gether with a description of the hardware chosen for this interface is described in
Appendix A. For the final version of the FMCM the transmission rate will be set
to 115.2 kbps, whereas for the current prototype the available speed is 38.4 kbps.
The Data Link Layer
The main task of the data link layer is to transform the raw bits into a stream of
data that appears free of errors to the upper layer. It operates with data in the form
of frames. The data link layer defines algorithms for achieving reliable, efficient
communication between to network nodes. The defined transmission protocol over
the serial link sends one byte at a time encapsulated by a start bit, a parity bit and
a stop bit, see Table 4.3.
1 bit 8 bits 1 bit 1 bit
Start bit Data Odd parity bit Stop bit
Table 4.3: The transmission protocol
The Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter (UART) translates data be-
tween parallel and serial interfaces, see Appendix A.2, and converts bytes of data
to and from asynchronous bit streams. In addition, each UART channel has a 64
bytes FIFO buffer for both transmission and receive, flow control, handling of spe-
cial characters and a programmable bit rate up to 1.5 Mbps. It also performs error
detection by computing the parity bit and comparing it with the expected value.
A driver is needed to interface the UART with the front end computer. It is required
to use a general driver developed by the front end section at CERN, as similar
hardware for serial communication is used by several systems.
The Transport Layer
The transport layer provides transparent transfer of data between end users and
control the reliability of a given link through flow control, segmentation/desegmen-
tation, and error control. The transport layer can keep track of the packets and
retransmit those that fail.
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The transport layer of the control interface is defined as the set of commands and
messages going over the RS-422 interface, and the rules for when and how they
are transmitted. The front end computer will manage the communication with
the FMCMS according to the system specification [12]. The rest of this section
describes the different commands and messages and the rules of transmission which
all together will be the requirements for the front end software. The design and
implementation of the software is presented in Section 4.2.
Six different commands will be sent from the front end computer to the FMCM.
The structure of the general command message is as shown in Table 4.4.
Byte Description
0:9 Synchronization 10 times ’0d’(hex)=cr(ASCII))
10 Start of command ’2a’=*
11 The command code See Table 4.5
12:17 The command arguments See Table 4.5
18:19 The command checksum Sum of command code and command
arguments as unsigned chars +55aa,
truncated to 16 bits
Table 4.4: The command (20 bytes)
The different commands are defined by the command code (1 byte) and the corre-
sponding command arguments (6 bytes), see Table 4.5.
Command code Description Command arguments
p Post Mortem 1 byte ’30’=0= U Mag
’31’=1= U Ext
’32’=2= I Diff Sim
’33’=3= I Diff DCCT
5 bytes ’30 30 30 30 30’=00000
t Update UTC 4 bytes UTC as UNIX time stamp
2 bytes Empty
d Simulate Dump 1 byte ’31’=1 (ch1 only)
’32’=2 (ch2 only)
’33’=3 (ch1 and ch2)
5 bytes ’44 55 4d 50 21’=DUMP!
r Reset Alarm Counter 1 byte ’31’=1= Reset
pre-alarm counter only
’32’=2= Reset
alarm counter only
’33’=3= Reset
both counters
5 bytes ’30 30 30 30 30’=00000
i Idle 6 bytes By choice
s Status 6 bytes ’30 30 30 30 30’=00000
Table 4.5: Command code and command arguments
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When the FMCM receives a command it replies with a message, and the front
end computer always waits for the message before sending a new command. The
status command is a request to the FMCM to send a status message, containing
information regarding the current state of the FMCM, configuration settings and so
on. The update UTC command includes the timing message of 32 bits described
in Section 4.1.2. When the FMCM receives this command it will synchronize the
internal clock to the pps and the UTC, and send a message back to the front end.
The simulate dump, reset alarm counter and idle command are mainly intended for
test purposes. When receiving a simulate dump command, the FMCM will send a
beam permit signal to the CIBU. The reset alarm counter command will tell the
FMCM to reset the alarm or pre-alarm counter which stop counting when they reach
their maximum value of 65535. The idle command could serve for several purposes
and its use in the communication process has not been exactly defined yet. Upon
arrival of a PM command the FMCM will read the PM data in its internal buffer
and include the data in a PM message to the front end computer.
Byte Description
0 Synchronization 1 times ’0d’(hex)=cr(ASCII))
1 Start of command ’2a’=*
2 The command code See Table 4.5
3:8 The command arguments See Table 4.5
9:10 The command checksum Sum of command code and command
arguments as unsigned chars
+55aa, truncated to 16 bits
11 Error bits Bit 0= parity error
Bit 1= Framing error
Bit 2= Unknown command
Bit 3= Unexpected command argument
Bit 4= Checksum error
Bit 5:7= 0 (spare)
12:18 Current time stamp 4 bytes for integer seconds
3 bytes for fractional seconds
19 Information bits Bit 0= LHC mode. Last PM acquisition was
triggered by external trigger
Bit 1= Time stamp message received, and
next pulse on UTC input will update time.
Bit 2= Time stamp initialized
Bit 3= Presently no reliable time stamp
Bit 4= PM flag. Inverted for each new
PM data set.
Bit 5= Logic state of time stamp
synchronization input (Input high = 1)
Bit 6:7 = 0 (spare)
20:26 Time stamp of last 4 bytes for integer seconds
PM acquisition 3 bytes for fractional seconds
27 Spare 0
Table 4.6: The response header (28 bytes)
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The update UTC and status commands will be sent periodically, whereas the simu-
late dump, reset alarm counter and idle command will be transmitted on request by
an operator. The PM command will be transmitted only when the time-stamp of
the last PM acquisition in the response header of one of the other messages changes,
see Table 4.6.
Byte Description
0 FPGA configuration. Version 1:255, 0=unknown
1:3 Up time in minutes 24 bits
4:5 Pre-alarm threshold
set by potentiometer
6:7 Alarm threshold set
by potentiometer
8:9 Alarm counter 0:65535, stopped at max value
10:11 Pre-Alarm counter 0:65535, stopped at max value
12:13 Actual Magnet Voltage 1 sample
14:15 Actual Voltage at 1 sample
connector U Ext
16:17 Actual calculated 1 sample
field change I Diff Sim
18:19 Actual calculated DCCT 1 sample
current change I Diff DCCT
20:21 Field deviation Minimum of last minute
22:23 Field deviation Maximum of last minute
24:27 Difference between old and
new time stamp
28 ID and configuration status Bit 0:5= Device ID
Bit 6= Magnet type (LHC=1,TL=0)
Bit 7= 1 if alarm activation below
5% is demanded
29 Device status Bit 0= Current alarm status
channel A(0=user permit for CIBU)
Bit 1= Current alarm status
channel B(0=user permit for CIBU)
Bit 2= Opto-coupled input(1=high)
Bit 3= TL mode: Alarm was active
during last extraction trigger.
If YES: PM data should be read
If NO: data can be read optionally
to compare with data of faulty
magnets.
30:31 Spare
Table 4.7: The status data (32 bytes)
The message from the FMCM is built up by the following elements: The response
header with 28 bytes, the data which can have various sizes, the response checksum
and the trailer. The response checksum is defined as the sum of the header bytes
and all data bytes referenced as unsigned chars, plus 55aa(hex), truncated to 16 bits.
The trailer marks the end of the packet using 2 bytes: ’3c 3e’(hex)= <>(ASCII).
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Only two of the six commands generate a response containing additional information
apart from the header. Those two are the PM message and the status message.
The status message consists of 32 bytes and the structure of the data is as shown
in Table 4.7. This information includes basic status data and configuration settings
that can be used for diagnostic purposes. In the PM message, the 2000 samples of
PM data are transmitted in consecutive order with one sample being two bytes as
indicated in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.3 summarizes the different types of commands and messages that are sent
over the RS422 interface.
Figure 4.3: Messages transmitted to and from one FMCM
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As the structures of the different commands and messages have been defined it is
time to establish the rules for when and how they are transmitted:
• The front end computer is always the master of communication. No data
will be transmitted by the FMCM without the front end computer having
requested it to do so. A command from the front end is always followed by a
response message from the FMCM.
• The FMCM will be requested by the front end computer to send a status
message twice every second.
• The update UTC command will be sent to the FMCM every 30 second.
• If the FMCM expects the start of a command and receives undefined data, it
answers with ’?’.
• There will be a timeout if a command to the FMCM is not completed after
0.2 seconds.
• If the time stamp of the last PM acquisition in the response header changes,
all other data transmission will be temporarily suspended and readout of the
PM data will be requested by the front end computer.
• The front end computer can only request PM data from one type of signal at
the time (U Mag, I Sim Diff, I Diff DCCT, U Ext).
• The RS-422 interface on the front end side must be able to receive a block of
at least 4096 bytes at 115.2 kpbs without buffer overflow.
• The system has to be able to manage the case when 26 FMCMs transmit PM
data at the same time, and up to four FMCMs for a single front end.
• Error handling procedures have to be part of the communication process in
order to ensure the readout of data from the various FMCMs, see Section 5.
If data is lost, alarms should be sent to the operators and the SCADA system.
• Recommended priority of transmission is:
1. PM message
2. update UTC message
3. simulate dump, reset alarm counter and Idle message
4. status message
The Application Layer
The Application layer provides the user with an application to access information
on the network. This layer is the main interface for the user to interact with the
application and the network.
The SCADA application for the FMCM control interface will be implemented by
the Application Section at CERN. As mentioned in the introduction, the objective
is to deliver an overall supervision application from which one can gain access to the
acquired data in the FMCM, present the data on a console in the CCC and remotely
supervise the device.
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4.2 Implementation of the Front End Computer
Software
4.2.1 Software Design
The front end software must fulfill all the requirements mentioned in Section 4.1.3.
A first attempt at understanding how this could be achieved resulted in the flowchart
in Figure 4.4. The flowchart sums up the most important tasks of the program, their
dependencies and priorities. The diamond shaped boxes are decisions regarding the
tasks represented in the square boxes. The arrows show the program flow. The task
with the lowest priority is the request and transmission of status data. At the same
time, this is the most frequent one. In normal operation, the status message is likely
to be the message that contributes with most information about the current state
of the FMCM. The next frequent task is the request and transmission of the update
UTC message which is transmitted every 30 seconds and has the second highest
priority. These two tasks will run continuously during normal operation and most
likely be the ones to trigger the PM command. The three remaining commands
simulate dump, reset alarm counter and idle message have an intermediate level of
priority and will be mostly used for test purposes.
The following occurs during the execution of a programme: A status command will
first be sent to the FMCM, the program waits for the response and checks if it is
valid. If the transmission takes too long the procedure will be repeated. The response
header of the incoming message is checked to see whether or not the PM time-stamp
has changed, if so, then the sending and receiving of PM data begins. Depending on
the parameters set for the PM command, the front end will either request PM data
in form of the measured magnet voltage (U Mag), simulated magnetic field changes
(I Diff Sim), DCCT current changes (I Diff DCCT) or the external voltage (U Ext).
Again the program will wait for the response, check if it is valid and retransmit if the
procedure takes too long. In normal circumstances, the program will then continue
to ask for status data, until the first update UTC command is triggered after 30
seconds.
The update UTC command will have to wait if the PM command is triggered at the
same time, and the status command will have to wait if any of the other commands
are triggered at the same time. Only one message can be processed at once, and
commands that are triggered during the processing of another message must wait
until the proceeding message has been successfully received or aborted. In the
meantime the pending tasks are stored in a First In First Out (FIFO) queue.
4.2.2 Software Design in the FESA Framework
To transfer these ideas into the FESA framework, the starting point was the FESA
Design tool, see Appendix C. The FESA Design tool is a wizard for modeling
equipment-software. The resulting equipment model contains Properties, Server
Actions and Real-time Actions, User Events and Timer Events, which together re-
flect the system specifications and define the software structure. This model is in
fact an XML (eXtensible Markup Language) file which is finally translated into a
FESA C++ project. The equipment model is shown in Appendix C.1. Figure 4.5
4.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRONT END COMPUTER SOFTWARE 33
F
ig
ur
e
4.
4:
F
lo
w
C
ha
rt
of
fr
on
t
en
d
co
m
pu
te
r
so
ft
w
ar
e
34 CHAPTER 4. THE FMCM CONTROL INTERFACE
shows the resulting software design and the relationships between the different ele-
ments in the equipment model and how they interact. The different pairs of com-
mands and messages which are being sent over the RS422 interface are defined as
actions. The request and receiving of UTC and status data are real time actions,
whereas the transmission of the idle command, the reset alarm counter command
and the simulate dump command with the corresponding responses are merged into
one server action. The request and receiving of PM data is implemented as a C++
class, independently of the equipment model, but has the same functionality as the
other real time actions. Each action is related to a property which is responsible
of keeping the information of the data fields that are changed due to that action.
While the program is running, the properties are displayed in the FESA Test tool
and can be accessed by an operator.
In Figure 4.5 the property SetCommand is set by the operator, and this triggers
the corresponding server action. By entering different values in the belonging data-
fields before setting the property, the operator can choose to send an idle command,
a simulate dump command or a reset alarm counter command. In the server ac-
tion the function call fireUserEvent() fires the user event which triggers the RT
action SetCommandRT. Depending on the command chosen by the operator, Set-
CommandRT will write the corresponding command to the RS422 link, wait for
the response and read the response header, the response checksum and the response
trailer. SetCommandRT is linked to four properties (Command, ResponseHeader,
ResponseChecksum and ResponseTrailer) whose data fields will be updated when
the real time action is finished. The inclusion of the Command property is not really
necessary to fulfill the requirements, but is a nice feature for test purposes.
The RT action UTCCommand is triggered every 30 seconds by the timer event Tick-
UTC. It writes the update UTC command to the RS422 interface, waits for the re-
sponse and reads the response header, the response checksum and the response trailer .
UTCCommand is linked to the same properties as SetCommandRT, except for the
Command property.
The RT action StatusCommand is triggered twice every second by the timer event
TickStatus. It writes the status command to the RS422 interface, waits for the re-
sponse and reads the response header, the status data, the response checksum and the
response trailer. StatusCommand is linked to the same properties as UTCCommand,
but has in addition the property StatusData.
The PMcommand can be triggered by all the other real time actions if the PM
timestamp in the response header changes. It is also linked to the same properties
as UTCCommand, but has in addition the property PMData.
The communication over the RS422 interface is supported by the implementation of
another class called TestFMCMRT. It establishes the connection with the FMCM,
and has write and read functions which are used by the real time actions to access
the RS422 interface. A collaboration diagram of the different C++ classes is shown
in Figure 4.6. It is important to note that these classes constitute a small part of
the FESA project generated from the equipment model. However, they are the only
ones that are implemented by the developer and they contain the most important
functionality. For example, the priorities of the different actions are handled by a
scheduler that is automatically generated. The developer can define these priorities
in the Equipment model, but is not allowed to change the code later on. The
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connection between a RT action and a Timer Event is also automatically generated.
Figure 4.6: Collaboration diagram of the implemented C++ classes
Chapter 5
Error Handling
In a communication system there is noise present in all practical situations. Noise
is defined as any signal interfering with the message being sent. It can be another
unwanted message or a random fluctuation in the signal level. As a result of the
physical processes generating the noise, errors tend to come in bursts. Having the
errors arriving in bursts has both advantages and disadvantages over single-bit er-
rors. In data transmission, data are always sent in blocks of bits. If errors were
independent most blocks would contain an error, but if the errors came in bursts
only a few blocks would be affected in average. The disadvantage of burst errors is
that they are much harder to correct than isolated bit-errors. A further discussion
of the noise sources in the LHC is given in Chapter 6.
The physical layer and the data link layer were specified from the beginning of this
project. In fact the decisions regarding the choice of technologies were a direct
consequence of the design of the FMCM and politics at CERN. Due to this fact,
there are certain limitations as to what can be done to improve the error handling.
To be able to correct bit errors it would be necessary to add some functionality in
the UART or in the driver. The UART is an of-the-shelf merchandise together with
the other RS-422 related hardware and is therefore difficult to change. The library
and driver for the RS-422 communication is developed and maintained by the Front
End Section at CERN. As many applications rely on this driver it is difficult to
introduce new functionality. This leaves the front end software, which only concerns
itself with packets of bytes. The only error detection on bit level is the odd parity
check in the UART.
5.1 Error Detection and Correction in
Serial Communication
There are two basic strategies for dealing with errors. One way is to include enough
redundant information along with each block of data, to make the receiver able to
deduce what the transmitted data must have been. The other way is to include just
enough information to make the receiver able to detect that an error has occurred,
but not which error or how many. The receiver will then request a retransmission.
The two strategies are discussed in this section together with a description of the
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chosen implementation concerning the front end computer software.
5.1.1 Error Detection
Error detection can ensure reliability by causing retransmission of blocks of data
until they are correctly received. It is not even necessary to detect all the errors as
one single error will require retransmission of the entire block. Error detection is
quite efficient when the errors come in bursts.
A well known error detection method is a retransmission scheme based on a checksum
calculation. The sender calculates a checksum for the block of data and appends it
at the end of the block. When the receiver receives the block it calculates exactly
the same checksum and compares it to the checksum at the end of the block. If
the two checksums match, the entire block is considered to be correct. However,
if the checksums do not match the receiver discards the block of data and it is
retransmitted by the sender.
Odd Parity Check
Odd parity check is a simple error-detecting method, where a parity bit is added to
the data. The parity bit is chosen to make the number of 1 bits odd for a given
codeword (sequence of bits). For example, when 1011010 is sent in odd parity, a
bit is added to the end to make it 10110101. With even parity 1011010 becomes
10110100. The receiver will perform the same calculation and check if the number
of 1 bits is in fact odd. If so, the last digit is removed which leaves the original
codeword. If the number is even, an error has occurred and the receiver will ask the
sender to retransmit the data.
Odd parity check is implemented in the UART and in the field programmable gate
array (FPGA) of the FMCM.
Error Handling in the Front End Computer
The FMCM sends messages to the front end computer as responses to commands.
The FMCM calculates a checksum for each message and sends it together with the
trailer at the end of the message. The front end calculates the same checksum
upon arrival of a new message and compares it with the checksum calculated by
the FMCM. The response checksum is defined as the sum of header bytes and all
data bytes referenced as unsigned chars, plus 55aa(hex), truncated to 16 bits. A
bit error during transmission will make the two checksums different, and the front
end computer will send the command once more to make the FMCM retransmit the
same message.
A counter is implemented to prevent an infinite loop of retransmissions, see Fig-
ure reffig: sekvensdia. The total number of times a message can be retransmitted
depends on how often the update UTC command is sent and the time interval be-
tween events. If a new event occurs before the old PM data has been successfully
received, one would no longer want to keep retransmitting the old PM data. Fur-
ther, it is not desired to delay the update UTC command as this would leave the
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time-stamp unsynchronized. Thus, the sequence of retransmissions for any message
should take less time than the interval between the update UTC commands or the
PM commands, whichever has the shortest interval. Also, the status message, which
is sent most frequently, should be successfully received before the next status mes-
sage is scheduled. If the counter expires the front end computer will try to store the
message anyway and send an alarm to the operator stating that the message is not
valid.
The checksum does not reveal whether only one or several bytes of the received
data are corrupted. To discover wrong conditions for transmission, such as buffer
overflow or a disconnected wire, the front end also checks the number of received
bytes to make sure this number matches the type of message it is supposed to have
received. It also checks if the command code is in the right place in the message, to
make sure the transmission was synchronized.
Figure 5.1: Sequence diagram of implemented error handling
Error Handling in the FMCM
A checksum is also included in the command sent to the FMCM. The purpose of the
checksum is to validate the incoming command especially to prevent the case where
an error in the bit stream would produce a dump of the LHC beam by activating
the simulate-dump feature inside the FMCM.
5.1.2 Forward Error Correction
The deliberate addition of redundant bits in order to correct possible errors is called
Forward Error Correction (FEC). A simple example of a FEC code would be an
analog to digital converter that samples three bits for every transmitted bit. If two
or more samples are zero, the transmitted bit is assumed to be zero, and if three
samples are all one, the transmitted bit was probably a one. FEC codes can be
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divided into two groups, block codes and convolutional codes. A block code maps a
block of k information bits into a block of n coded bits, where n>k. The n coded bits
only depend on the k source bits and is therefore said to be a memoryless coding
scheme. Such a block code has code rate k/n and is referred to as a (n,k) code.
A convolutional coder also produces coded bits at a higher rate than the source
bits, but it does it without dividing the source bits into blocks. The name refers to
the fact that the added redundant bits are generated by modulo-two convolutions.
A convolutional coder is a finite memory system and implemented by use of m
delay elements and modulo-two adders. The transformation from information bits
to coded bits is a function of the last m bits in the stream. Some examples of
block codes are Hamming codes, Reed-Solomon codes and LDPC codes. The Turbo
algorithm uses two simple convolutional codes with interleaving. [14, 15]
The advantage of FEC is that retransmission of data often can be avoided, at the
cost of higher bandwidth, and is therefore applied in situations where retransmission
is relatively costly or impossible. FEC devices are often located close to the receiver
of an analog signal, in the first stage of digital processing after a signal has been
received. That is, forward error correction is often an integral part of the analog-
to-digital conversion process. It would be feasible to implement error correction in
the FPGA of the FMCM. The problem is on the other side of the link as it would
be preferable to have this functionality in the UART, or at least in the software
controlling the UART (driver). However, as this is not possible it would have to be
implemented in the front end software, which would be a poor solution. The front
end software receives bytes from the RS-422 interface and treats them as characters.
The characters would then need to be split into bits and reassembled again after the
error correction. If the results of the tests in Chapter 6 shows that retransmission
is too costly, one would rather choose to change the hardware than to implement
error correction in the front end computer. [14, 13, 16]
Part III
Testing & Analysis
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Chapter 6
Tests
Primarily three tests will be done on the FMCM control interface: Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC) tests, Signal Integrity (SI) analysis and an endurance run with
error handling tests. The EMC tests and signal integrity analysis will show whether
or not the RS-422 serial interface can handle the noisy environment it will operate
in. The EMC test will be done twice, first without any error handling and later
after implementation of the error detection it will be repeated to verify an increase
in the performance regarding reliability. The final test will be an endurance run
where several events will provoke errors. These errors should then be corrected by
the implemented error handling scheme. The endurance run will also be an overall
test to see if both hardware and software of the FMCM control interface is working
correctly.
This chapter starts with a discussion over the most probable noise sources in the
LHC and transfer lines that can affect the RS-422 link. This is mostly related to the
EMC test. Background theory on the EMC test and SI analysis is given together
with a description of the corresponding test plan, test setup and test requirements.
The results of the tests will be presented in Chapter 7.
6.1 Discussion of the Environmental Conditions for the
RS-422 link
The different types of disturbance in an environment like the LHC can be divided into
four groups. Mains failure can be caused by thunder storms and short-circuits inside
the electrical network at CERN. Such failures will definitely result in accelerator
downtime. Voltage dips and voltage swells are mostly caused by sudden change
of load, short-circuits inside or outside CERN and thunder storms. This might
result in accelerator downtime. Transients are often caused by switching mode
equipment, power converters (thyristors) and thunder storms and leads to failure
in the electronics. Harmonics can be caused by non-linear loads and results in
malfunctioning electronics.
Noise sources are either wide-band or narrow-band. Wide-band noise is experi-
enced for thermal noise, noise from fluorescent lamps, brush motors and data links.
Narrow-band noise can originate from a transient or an harmonic due to switching of
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Figure 6.1: Mains failure [17] Figure 6.2: Voltage dip/swell [17]
Figure 6.3: Transients [17] Figure 6.4: Harmonics [17]
power supplies, power lines and discharges. The equipment for the control interface
of the FMCM is either installed in the LHC tunnel, or in the LHC surface buildings.
The equipment installed at the different locations contribute to the electromagnetic
environment. The front end analogue electronics have a bandwidth that is usually
lower than 20 MHz and is sensitive to interference in this range, mostly coupled to
cables in form of common mode voltage.
Impulsive Noise
The equipment most likely to cause interference in the LHC tunnel are stepping
motors and power converters. A stepping motor is an electromagnetic device that
converts digital pulses into mechanical shaft rotation. In the LHC stepping motors
are used to position the collimator jaws and there will be about 250 collimators
along the beam pipe. Each collimator is connected to four stepping motors. The
stepping motors work with pulses with amplitudes of 2 to 5 Amperes and exhibit
noise in the frequency band up to 20 MHz.
The noise due to power converters originates from fast switching of components
such as thyristors and control electronics. The noise emission of the power converter
current have peaks at 25 kHz and 75 kHz in the frequency range from 0 to 150
kHz. The power cables radiate rather strong magnetic fields in addition to radiation
caused by ripple currents riding on top of the fundamental frequency. [18, 19, 20,
21, 22]
Crosstalk
If two lines carrying signals are run near to one another then by inductive and
capacitive coupling the signal of one appears one the other and vice versa. This
is called crosstalk. The numerous installations in the LHC tunnel requires a high
density of cables. Due to the dominant noise emission from the power converters
and the stepping motors, their cables are in separate cable trays and as far away
as possible from other equipment and cables used for equipment control. Crosstalk
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varies with frequency and proper shielding. Cable termination and earthing is the
best way to limit crosstalk and cable emissions in general. However it can never be
entirely eliminated.
White Noise
In electronic circuits, white noise originates from many sources, one being the slightly
random motion of electrons through a conductor sometimes called thermal noise. In
addition, the other equipment installed in the LHC will also emit noise that has not
yet been specified nor measured. This noise is assumed to be negligible.
To meet the general requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, proper design
of the equipment and proper planning of the installations are crucial. Equipment
is tested before installation to make sure it fulfills the general requirements and is
immune to the common noise sources in the tunnel and related surface buildings.
However, it is during the design process of the equipment one can truly affect its
electromagnetic qualities.
6.2 Electromagnetic Compatibility Test
Electromagnetic compatibility is the ability of an equipment or system to
function satisfactorily in its electromagnetic environment without intro-
ducing intolerable electromagnetic disturbance to anything in that envi-
ronment. [23]
There are different levels of electromagnetic compatibility, with level 1 being suitable
for equipment installed in a well-protected environment (e.g. computer room). Level
2 applies to equipment installed in a normally protected environment like computer
and control rooms of industrial or electrical plants. Level 3 applies to equipment
installed in an unprotected environment like public distribution networks and in-
dustrial process areas. Level 4 is the highest EMC level, where the equipment must
function satisfactorily in a heavily disturbed environment. The RS-422 interface of
the FMCM should be electromagnetic compatible with a level 4 environment.
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has standardized several im-
munity tests which are used to document the EMC level of a system [24]. These
tests are divided into 6 categories by the type of disturbance experienced by the sys-
tem. The first category is low-frequency disturbance which is typical for low-voltage
power supplies. The second category is conducted transients and high-frequency
(HF) disturbances. The four remaining categories are electrostatic charges, mag-
netic disturbances, electromagnetic disturbances and other immunity tests. The
test chosen for the control interface of the FMCM is a fast transient burst test in
the second test category. The purpose of this test is to verify the immunity of the
system against bursts of very short transients. These transients are typically due to
switching of small inductive loads, conducted interference and radiated interference.
Significant for this test is the fast rise time, short duration, low energy but high rep-
etition rate of the transients. The transient burst test is chosen by practical reasons,
as it covers the most likely cases of disturbance and is easy to carry out. It does
46 CHAPTER 6. TESTS
not require lots of equipment or any special facilities, and has been shown to be a
representative indicator for the susceptibility of equipment to any electromagnetic
noise in the LHC.
The EMC test is primarily a post layout test for the RS-422 interface where a burst
generator applies a test voltage on the RS-422 link. There will be no changes in
the hardware design of the RS-422 interface due to the results of these tests, but
encountered errors must be handled by the front end software. Errors that occur due
to the transients will propagate through the system and be detected by the software.
This test is therefore helpful to investigate the quality of the software and to reveal
the necessity of better error handling. The free parameters of the test is the shielding
technique of the cable and the amplitude of the transients. Other interfaces of the
FMCM like the CIBU and timing interface will also be tested simultaneously. The
test results are classified into four categories, see Table 6.1
Test Result Description Example
A No Noticeable Fault No signals are seen to be perturbed
B Corrected Fault Single byte errors
C Fault Complete messages are lost
D Complete Failure No communication
Table 6.1: EMC Test Result Classification
6.2.1 Characteristics of the Fast Transient Bursts
The fast transient burst is specified by the IEC standard 61000-4-4. Typical char-
acteristics of bursts applied during EMC tests are listed in Table 6.2. The open
circuit voltage of the generator corresponding to the different EMC levels are given
in Table 6.3. The specifications in the standard are meant as guidelines, but can be
slightly changed according to specific needs. However, any changes must under no
circumstances lower the requirements on the different EMC levels. Figure 6.5 and
Figure 6.6 show a typical transient pulse and a transient burst.
Rise time of a pulse (10 % - 90 %) 5 ns ± 30 %
Pulse duration 50 ns ± 30 %
Repetition frequency 5 kHz
Duration of a burst 15 ms
Burst period 300 ms
Table 6.2: Test wave characteristics [23]
6.2. ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY TEST 47
EMC Level Ups (kV) (IEC standard) Up (kV)
1 0.25 0.5
2 0.5 1
3 1 1.5
4 2 2
Table 6.3: Recommended amplitudes for the different severity levels. Ups (kV) is
the voltage level recommended by the IEC standard. Up is the open circuit voltage
of the burst generator chosen for the current tests. [23]
Figure 6.5: Waveshape of a single pulse into a 50 Ω load (normalized double expo-
nential pulse) [24]
Figure 6.6: Fast transient burst with burst duration 15 ms and burst period 300 ms
[24]
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6.2.2 Test Setup
Test Equipment
• Fast transient burst generator (Hafely)
• Coupling device, 30 cm of conductive foil enveloping the lines.
• Textronix oscilloscope with 250 MHz bandwidth.
• Metal plate to produce common ground and reference potential.
• Shielded twisted pair cable for the RS-422 link (104 m), as will be used in the
installations later on, with CANON D-SUB 9 pin connectors.
• Timing cable, CAD 50 with LEMO connectors.
• CIBU cable, NE8 with metal Burndy connectors
Figure 6.7: Installation of equipment during the EMC test
Figure 6.7 shows the installation of the equipment for the EMC test. A metal plate
is used to provide a common ground reference. The burst generator is a device
that produces voltage transients in bursts and can be programmed for the different
EMC levels. A conductive metal foil is wrapped around 30 cm of the cable which is
to be tested, and the voltage from the burst generator is applied to this foil. The
RS-422 cable is connected between the FMCM and the VIPC626 card, the timing
cable is connected between the FMCM and the timing card connected to the front
end computer, and finally the CIBU cable is connected between the FMCM and the
CIBU. The different signals are taken from the corresponding receiver circuits in the
FMCM and analyzed on the oscilloscope. For the tests of the RS-422 interface, the
transmission errors are detected by the front end software.
The Front End Software
A simplified version of the front end software will be used for the first EMC tests.
The FMCM will be requested to continuously transmit PM data. One message will
consist of 512 bytes, containing the integer numbers from 0 to 256. The FMCM
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transmits one data sample as two bytes, and this is why the temporary test mes-
sage counts to 256 and not 512. The communication is not continuous but the gap
between consecutive messages will be minimized. The idea is that since the imple-
mentation of the different messages in the final software is very similar, any problems
occurring with the PM message will occur with the other messages. The need for
error handling will be the same as well. The software can detect any occurring byte
errors and counts the number of bytes successfully received as well as the number
of erroneous bytes.
For the second EMC test, an appropriate error handling procedure will be imple-
mented, see Chapter 5. The performance of the driver will be increased so it can
receive and send packets of 4096 bytes. The FMCM will be requested to continuously
transmit PM data of 4000 bytes containing the numbers from 0 to 1999. As before,
the communication is not continuous but the gap between consecutive messages will
be minimized. In addition to the counting of erroneous bytes, the front end software
will count the number of retransmission, the number of failed transmissions and
further distinguish between two types of errors. The first type of error is corrupted
bytes where the entire message has been received but one or several bytes have the
wrong value. The other type of error is corrupted bytes that are not understood by
the receiver and therefore not received at all.
The transmission rate is set to 38.4 kbps as this is the only speed available with the
current prototype of the FMCM.
6.2.3 Test Plan
For the RS-422 interface the tests will be done with the following combinations of
shielding techniques and transient amplitudes, see Table 6.4. The different shielding
techniques are shown in Figure 6.8, Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10. The CIBU interface
and the timing interface will also be tested for the different EMC levels, with the
shield of the cables grounded on both sides.
Shielding of cable Severity level
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Grounded on both sides
Grounded on one side
Not grounded
Table 6.4: Matrix of combinations for the EMC test of the RS-422 interface
A solid shield that completely surrounds a cable can be at any potential and still
provide effective shielding, as long as the cable has no connection to the outside
world. Thus the shield does not need to be grounded nor to have its potential
defined in any way.
In most practical cases however, the shield is not a complete enclosure, and the cable
inside does have connections to the outside world. In such cases the shield must be
grounded, to avoid the potential of the shield from coupling with the signal going
through the cable.
Grounding has a number of additional benefits. It prevents the build-up of AC
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Figure 6.8: The first test uses a 360-degree shield at both ends of the cable, with
two ground wires fixed at the FMCM side and the interface side.
Figure 6.9: The second test uses a 360-degree shield at both ends of the cable, with
the ground wire connected on the VME side.
Figure 6.10: The third test uses a 360-degree shield at both ends of the cable, with
the ground wires connected on neither side.
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potential on the equipment enclosure, it provides a current-return path to protect
personnel from shock hazards, and it prevents the build-up of static charge. For
these reasons, all metallic parts of a system should be grounded, and each part must
have a low-impedance contact in at least two places. [25]
6.2.4 Test Requirements
For the testing of the CIBU interface and the timing interface the requirements
are quite simple. A disturbance should not change the transmitted value of the
USER PERMIT signal from the FMCM to the CIBU. The received data can be
monitored on the CIBU by two LEDs blinking green if the signal is true, and red if
it is false. The signal on the timing cable is a 1Hz clock signal. This signal can be
monitored on the front panel of the FMCM by one green LED. In normal operation
it blinks once per second. If this changes in any way it means the signal is disturbed.
For the RS-422 interface, it is expected to obtain the best results with the shielded
cable grounded on both sides. The purpose of the EMC test for the RS-422 interface
is to establish this fact and to analyze the severity of the errors that occur for the
best choice of cable shielding.
For the second EMC test, it will be important to confirm the results from the first
test, but also to verify the softwares capability to handle errors when they occur.
6.3 Signal Integrity Analysis
Signal Integrity (SI) or self-compatibility is an other aspect of EMC. In contrast to
regular EMC tests which check the systems capability to handle disturbance coming
from outside the system, SI analysis reveals interference within the system itself.
Digital systems become sensitive to the analog nature of the signal waveform at
high transmission speeds. Ideally digital signals are square waves, but in reality
they are limited by finite rise times. The logic which is used to determine whether
the state of a digital signal is high or low is based on thresholds. Analog effects
like ringing, overshoot, undershoot and non-monotonic behavior in the transition
region can change the state of the signal and create transmission errors. A way to
analyze the signal integrity is to measure the opening of the eye-diagram. The eye
diagram of a signal is an infinite persistent trace where the waveform is traced over
the previous trace. The signal integrity of digital signals can be affected by poor
layout of the printed circuit board, cross-coupling from other signals, poor shielding
of the cables and by overloading a driving circuit. Unmatched transmission lines
can cause unwanted reflections which interfere with the signal. All of these factors
combine to shrink the opening of the eye-diagram [26].
The jitter of an eye diagram is directly linked to the signal quality from which one
can predict the reliability of the data link. The eye diagram is used because it
requires simple equipment and is easy to conduct compared to a Bit Error Rate
(BER) test, which requires a very long test time. The total jitter tTJ is measured
at the line of zero differential voltage and the quantity tS is the duration of a bit
symbol as shown in Figure 6.11. Since the measurements are made with a differential
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probe, which subtracts VOUT+ from VOUT−, the eye diagram shows the differential
peak-to-peak voltage defined as Vp−p [27].
Figure 6.11: Jitter measurement at zero differential voltage line
To decide if it is necessary to perform a SI analysis on a connection one should first
calculate its electrical length. When the wavelength becomes comparable to the
cable dimensions, the interconnection must be treated as a high frequency design.
The electrical length is defined as the ratio of the physical length l of the device to
the signal wavelength λ [28]:
Electrical length =
l
λ
(6.1)
In general, any device whose electrical length is less then about 1/20 can be consid-
ered electrically short [28]. Circuits that are electrically short can be described by
basic circuit theory. On the other hand, electrically long circuits require RF tech-
niques and knowledge of electromagnetism. Signal Integrity analysis is important
for electrically long circuits. The signal wavelength is calculated from the signal
rise time. In digital systems the rise time is significantly smaller than the symbols
“high” or “low”period, hence the equivalent wavelength is smaller than the natural
signal wavelength. The wavelength based on the rise time is therefore best suited
for the electrical length calculation as it is the smallest measurable wavelength in
the signal and more critical with respect to signal integrity. The rise time of the
RS-422 signal with the envisaged transmission rate of 115.2 kbps is approximately
70 ns. The corresponding frequency can be found from
fr =
1
pi × tr (6.2)
where fr is the frequency in Hertz and tr is the rise time in seconds [28]. This means
that a 70 ns rise time has an equivalent frequency of 4.5 MHz, in a cable this can
be approximated by the following [6, 28]:
λr =
0.5× c
fr
(6.3)
Hence,
Electrical length =
l
λ
=
l
0.5× c× pi × tr (6.4)
Table 6.5 shows the electrical length of some typical cables that are going to be used
in the LHC and the transfer lines for the RS-422 serial interface of the FMCM.
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Cable length Electrical length
54 m 2.1
100 m 3.5
141 m 5.0
Table 6.5: Calculated electrical length as a function of cable length, and transmission
rate equal to 115.2 kbps.
6.3.1 Test Setup
Test equipment
• Oscilloscope (Textronik)
• Differential probe (Textronik)
• Shielded twisted pair cable for the RS-422 link.
• Test signal generated by the FMCM control interface.
Figure 6.12: Equipment setup for the SI analysis
6.3.2 Test Plan
The SI analysis is a test for the RS-422 interface. The free parameters of the test are
the length of the RS-422 cable and the transmission speed. It is assumed that the
EMC test in Section 6.2 has been conducted on this stage, and that the shielding of
the cable with the best EMC qualities has been chosen.
Transmission rate Cable length
54 m 100 m 141 m
19.2 kbps
38.4 kbps
57.6 kbps
115.2 kbps
Table 6.6: Matrix of combinations for the SI analysis
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6.3.3 Test Requirements
The purpose of the SI analysis is to confirm the current setup of the RS-422 se-
rial interface. That is, to verify the configuration of the cables and the choice of
hardware. It is important that the length of the cables does not degrade the signal
integrity. If the opening of the eye diagram is wide, the jitter in the eye diagram is
negligible compared to the duration of one bit and the signal integrity is said to be
good.
6.4 Endurance Run and Reliability Test
The endurance run is the final test to validate the general functionality of the FMCM
control interface. The purpose of this test is to verify that the requirements for the
FMCM control interface are fulfilled, and that the front end software can deliver its
services to the interface in an efficient and reliable way.
The different functionalities of the front end software will be tested according to the
requirements in Section 4.1.3. To be validated, a requirement must be implemented
and the functionality must be according to the specification. The software will be
run on a front end computer in a test laboratory for minimum 48 hours. During the
last hour one will try to provoke errors by deliberately disturbing the signal. These
errors should then be corrected by the implemented error handling scheme. It is
also important to check whether the communication between the FMCM and the
front end computer is following the rules set in the requirements.
6.4.1 Status of Required Implementations
As one is currently working on a prototype of the FMCM, not all the functionality
is available. Hence, some of the requirements could not be validated with this test.
The status of the required implementations common to the FMCM and the front
end software are shown in Table 6.7.
All the commands and messages are implemented on both sides, however the status
message and the PM message only contain test data. In the response header some
bytes are filled with dummy-data, that is for the error bits, the information bits and
the time-stamp of the last PM acquisition.
Certain requirements like the transmission rate and the two checksums were vali-
dated prior to the endurance run, by connecting the front end computer to a PC.
The front end computer communicated with a visual basic program that had the
most basic functionalities of the FMCM implemented.
In addition there are certain requirements that only concern the front end software,
see Table 6.8.
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Required Functionality FMCM (FPGA version 7) Front end software
The status command/message × ×
The update UTC command/message × ×
The PM command/message × ×
The idle command/message × ×
The reset alarm counter com-
mand/message
× ×
The simulate dump command/mes-
sage
× ×
If the FMCM receives undefined data,
it answers with ’?’
Timeout if command is not finished af-
ter 0.2 seconds
Four types of PM data: U Mag,
I Sim Diff, I Diff DCCT and U Ext
× ×
Transmission speed 115.2 kbps ×
Command checksum × ×
Response checksum ×
Time-stamp of last PM acquisition ×
Current time-stamp × ×
Table 6.7: Functionalities implemented in the prototype of the FMCM and the front
end software
Required Functionality Implemented
The status command is sent twice ev-
ery second
×
The update UTC command is sent
once every 30 second
×
If the PM time-stamp changes, read-
out of the PM data will be requested
by the front end computer
×
Transmission errors must be handled
by the front end software
×
The PM command has 1st priority ×
The update UTC command has 2nd
priority
×
The simulate dump, reset alarm
counter and idle message have 3rd pri-
ority
×
Thestatus message has last priority ×
Table 6.8: Specific requirements for the front end software
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Finally, the general requirements for the control interface should be validated:
1. FMCM is the master of communication
2. The RS-422 interface must be able to receive a block of at least 4096 bytes at
115.2 kbps
3. It must be possible for 26 FMCMs to transmit PM data at the same time, and
up to four FMCMs for a single front end.
The first general requirement is implemented in both the FMCM and the front end
computer. To meet the second requirement it was necessary to add some function-
ality in the driver controlling the UART. This was taken care of by the Front End
Section at CERN. The third requirement has been partly implemented, meaning
this functionality is included in the FESA framework. However, as there is only one
prototype of the FMCM available, this requirement will not be validated during the
endurance run.
6.4.2 Test Setup
The test setup will be as for the EMC test, see Section 6.2.2, and the cable shield
of the twisted pair cable will be grounded on both sides during the entire test.
Front End Software
Even though some functionality is missing in the FMCM prototype, most of the re-
quirements will be tested. For example to test the triggering of a PM command due
to a change in the PM time-stamp, a change in the fourth byte of the current time-
stamp found in the response header will be used. This byte changes approximately
once every fourth minute.
Due to the processing time in the FMCM, the front end computer and the RS-422
interface, the transfer of commands and messages take more time then what the
transmission rate implies. By doing simple tests the minimum required time for
transmissions of the different messages were measured, and the maximum number
of retransmissions were calculated. With a transmission rate of 38.4 kbps the sum
of the processing and transmission time of the PM message was measured to about
2 seconds, the status message 120 ms, the update UTC, simulate dump, reset alarm
counter and idle 10 ms. It was decided that all the messages should be transfered
within 500 ms, the interval between consecutive status commands, except for the PM
message which should be transfered within 20 seconds (the minimum time between
events in the transfer lines). By limiting the number of retransmissions to five with
a margin of one retransmission, the different messages got the following constraints:
• PM message : 5 retransmissions
• Status message : 3 retransmissions
• Update UTC, simulate dump, reset alarm counter and idle message : 5 re-
transmissions
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To specifically test the error handling, counters are implemented to keep a record
of the number of messages sent, the number of messages received, the number of
retransmissions and the number of failed transmissions for each type of message.
The number of sent messages is the total number of messages sent over the RS-422
interface, including the retransmissions. It is a requirement that every message is
received before it reaches the maximum number of retransmission, hence no failed
transmissions. It is desired that the total number of retransmissions is kept on a
reasonably low level.
6.4.3 Test Plan
The endurance run will last for 48 hours, divided into three test periods. During the
first 46 hours and 50 minutes the front end software will run as in normal operation.
In the second period, lasting 10 minutes, several sever actions (idle commands) will
be triggered from the FESA Test Tool, see Appendix C.1. In the last hour the same
burst generator as used in the EMC test, see Section 6.2.2, will be used to apply
noise onto the shielded twisted pair cable. The repetition frequency will be set to 5
kHz and the voltage to 2 kV.

Chapter 7
Results
This chapter sums up the different results obtained during the project period. The
test procedures are described in Chapter 6 and the corresponding results are pre-
sented in the same order. Each presentation is followed by a discussion comparing
the results with the test requirements.
7.1 Results of EMC Tests
For the EMC tests, the results are classified as described in Table 6.1.
7.1.1 The FMCM Timing Interface
It was important to verify that the timing interface of the FMCM could operate in
a level 4 EMC environment. Reliable delivery of PM data depends on the accuracy
of the time stamp and the PM trigger received from the timing interface. During
Signal from timing card Severity level
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
pps A A A A
Table 7.1: EMC test results of the signal from the timing card to the FMCM
the test, the pps signal made the LED on the front panel of the FMCM blink once
per second (1 kHz). Disturbance caused by the burst generator would have made
the LED blink more or less frequently if the timing interface was susceptible to this
noise. Hence, the timing interface of the FMCM passed the EMC requirements.
7.1.2 The FMCM CIBU Interface
The CIBU interface is important as it is responsible for sending USER PERMIT
signals from the FMCM to the Beam Interlock System. When the FMCM detects
an error in the powering of the protected magnet it will send a signal to the CIBU
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Signal from FMCM Severity level
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
USER PERMIT TRUE A A A A
USER PERMIT FALSE A A A A
Table 7.2: EMC test results of the signal from FMCM to the CIBU
requesting a beam dump. The interface therefore has high requirements for electro-
magnetic compatibility. Disturbance caused by the burst generator did not change
the transmitted value of the USER PERMIT signal from the FMCM to the CIBU.
The received data was monitored by looking at two LEDs on the CIBU blinking
green if the signal was true, and red if it was false. This was consistent throughout
the EMC test.
7.1.3 The RS-422 Interface
Three groups of tests were conducted for the RS-422 interface. In each group, a
different shielding technique for the cable was selected and the EMC level varied
from 1 to 4. The main results are shown in Table 7.3.
Shielding of cable Severity level
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Grounded on both sides A A A A
Grounded on one side B B B B
Not grounded A B B B
Table 7.3: Results EMC test of RS-422 interface
Figure 7.1: Screen shot of the two signals taken from the input of the differential
receiver of the FMCM. One can clearly see the transients disturbing the signal.
None of the tests generated more than single byte errors. The communication be-
tween the FMCM and the front end computer was stable during the entire test
period meaning that all commands were received by the FMCM and it answered
with the correct response. Under no circumstances did the burst test cause entire
frames to be lost. In fact, it was necessary to increase the repetition frequency of
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the transients to detect any errors at all. The burst generator was programmed with
a repetition rate of 66 kHz in stead of 5 kHz, see Table 6.2.
The actual disturbance made by the transients could be clearly seen on the oscil-
loscope. However, as the transients are short of duration compared to the signal
pulse, the analog to digital converter managed in most cases to sample the signal
in between the transients, see Figure 7.1. With the transmission speed set to 38.4
kbps and a repetition rate of 66 kHz, the number of transients affecting one single
data bit is 1.7 in average.
Figure 7.2: Graph showing the num-
ber of erroneous bytes during two
EMC test periods with transient burst
of 0.5 kV and repetition frequency 66
kHz. The shielding of the cable was
grounded on the VME side. The first
test run provoked 13 byte errors and
the second run 11 byte errors.
Figure 7.3: Graph showing the num-
ber of erroneous bytes during two
EMC test periods with transient burst
of 1 kV and repetition frequency 66
kHz. The shielding of the cable was
grounded on the VME side. The first
test run provoked 161 byte errors and
the second run 119 byte errors.
Figure 7.4: Graph showing the num-
ber of erroneous bytes during two
EMC test periods with transient burst
of 1.5 kV and repetition frequency 66
kHz. The shielding of the cable was
grounded on the VME side. The first
test run provoked 182 byte errors and
the second run 141 byte errors.
Figure 7.5: Graph showing the num-
ber of erroneous bytes during two
EMC test periods with transient burst
of 2 kV and repetition frequency 66
kHz. The shielding of the cable was
grounded on the VME side.The first
test run provoked 239 byte errors and
the second run 276 byte errors.
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The front end software verified the received PM messages and compared each byte
with the expected value. 14 bytes of the Response Header are time stamp values
that changes continuously and were therefore eliminated from the comparison. This
means that during a successful transmission the front end software counted 498
bytes. One test-period lasted 2 minutes, and a PM message was transmitted once
every 1.2 seconds. Hence, during one period 51200 bytes were sent from the FMCM
to the front end computer, and 49800 bytes were checked. The result of the byte
error count was presented in a graph, and Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3, Figure 7.4 and
Figure 7.5 show the results for the different EMC levels, with the shielding of the
cable being grounded on the VME side.
Table 7.4 gives a resume of the obtained results for all the combinations of shielding.
In the worst case the byte error rate was 0.0055 for tests on EMC level 4.
Shielding of cable Severity level
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Grounded on both sides
First Run 0 0 0 0
Second Run 0 0 0 0
Grounded on one side
First Run 13 161 182 239
Second Run 11 191 141 276
Not grounded
First Run 0 68 159 268
Second Run 0 65 153 269
Table 7.4: Results of the EMC test for the RS-422 interface. The table indicates
the number of erroneous bytes detected by the front end software during one test
run where 100 PM messages were transmitted.
7.1.4 Discussion of Results
When the shielding of the cable was grounded on both sides no errors were detected.
When the shielding was not grounded at all, the results were better for lower voltages
but worse for bursts of 2 kV compared to when the shielding was grounded on one
side. A possible explanation for this is that when the shield was grounded on one
side, energy might have flown to the ground connected to the receiving circuit on
the VME side. This would have caused a bounce in the ground potential and wrong
conditions for the receiver. When the voltage increased to 2 kV this effect probably
got small compared to the disturbance from the bursts affecting the signal lines
themselves.
There are several limitations to this test. To be able to produce a true byte error rate,
the tests should have been run continuously for a longer period of time. However,
the results give a clear indication to the choice of cable shielding. Also, having
bursts in the LHC were the repetition rate of the transient pulses is 66 kHz is very
unlikely. This gives an almost continuous train of pulses, and in real life a repetition
rate of 5 kHz would cover most worst case scenarios. In addition, a series of burst
will most likely only last a couple of seconds. This means in fact that the byte errors
will occur less frequently and can therefore be handled by a simple retransmission
scheme with the combination of cable shielding grounded on both sides.
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7.2 Results of EMC Test with Error Handling
For the second EMC test only the RS-422 interface was considered, and the error
handling procedure in Section 5.1.1 was implemented. As before three groups of
tests were conducted where in each group a different shielding technique for the
cable was selected and the EMC level varied from 1 to 4.
The setup for the two EMC tests were identical except for the driver and the front
end software. A new driver gave the possibility to transmit real PM messages with
4032 bytes. It turned out that this change affected the configuration of the EMC
test. For the second test it was possible to detect errors when the repetition rate of
the transients was 5 kHz, which is according to the standard for these tests. The
errors had a tendency of appearing at the end of the message, which is why longer
messages gave different results. The main results are listed in Table 7.5.
Shielding of cable Severity level
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Grounded on both sides A A A A
Grounded on one side A A B C
Not grounded A B B C
Table 7.5: Results of second EMC test for the RS-422 interface
During a successful transmission the front end software counted 4018 bytes (4032
bytes minus the time-stamps). One test-period lasted 2 minutes, and a PM message
was transmitted once every 2.1 seconds. This was about the time it took to process
one command, send it, wait for the reply and receive the response. Hence, during one
test period 57 PM messages were sent from the FMCM to the front end computer,
and 229026 bytes were checked.
The number of byte errors, the number of retransmissions and the number of failed
transmissions for each group of tests are given in Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8.
The tests were run twice on each EMC level, and each column in the tables cor-
respond to the same run. There are two types of erroneous bytes; corrupted bytes
that appear to have been successfully received and corrupted bytes that are not un-
derstood by the receiver and therefore not received at all. Erroneous bytes triggered
a retransmission of the message and it could be retransmitted 5 times before it was
defined as a failed transmission and discarded. No effort was made to try and save
parts of the message.
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Byte Errors in Total 0 0 1 10 35 41 71 59
Bytes Not Received 0 0 1 10 29 35 68 57
Corrupted Bytes 0 0 0 0 6 6 3 2
Retransmissions 0 0 1 10 31 32 50 43
Failed Transmissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
Table 7.6: Results of the second EMC test. Cable shield not grounded.
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0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Byte Errors in Total 0 0 0 0 19 20 82 77
Bytes Not Received 0 0 0 0 19 17 81 77
Corrupted Bytes 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0
Retransmissions 0 0 0 0 15 20 41 40
Failed Transmissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2
Table 7.7: Results of the second EMC test. Cable shield grounded on one side.
0.5 kV 1 kV 1.5 kV 2 kV
Byte Errors in Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bytes Not Received 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Corrupted Bytes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Retransmissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Failed Transmissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7.8: Results of the second EMC test. Cable shield grounded on both sides.
7.2.1 Discussion of Results
The second EMC test confirmed the fact that having the shielding of the cable
grounded on both sides is very important. No errors were detected during the
EMC test with this shielding technique, even with the repetition frequency of the
transients being increased to 66 kHz and the voltage raised to 4 kV.
When the shielding was not grounded at all, the results were better for lower voltages
but worse for bursts of 2 kV compared to when the shielding was grounded on one
side. This was also experienced for the first EMC test and discussed in Section 7.1.4.
The most interesting results concerning the front end software was the number of
retransmissions and particularly the number of failed transmissions. Comparing the
number of retransmissions with the number of erroneous bytes, one can see that
single byte errors in a message was most common, which is why the number of
retransmissions was quite high. During the test a new PM message was transmitted
every 2.1 seconds which is about the same time it takes to process the message.
This means that most of the PM messages were put in a queue while the FMCM
was retransmitting the messages containing byte errors. The only case where the
transmission failed was when the voltage was raised to 2 kV and the cable shield
was not grounded on one side or neither.
During normal operation of the LHC, events that trigger a PM message might occur
every 20 seconds in the worst case. This time interval is large enough to ensure
reliable transmission of the PM message. The PM message will therefore not be put
in a queue due to retransmission of the previous PM data set as seen during the
tests. Considering the fact that transmission failures only took place at the highest
EMC level with poor shielding of the cable and with a limit of five retransmissions
one can conclude that the software will be able to handle the most likely errors. If
necessary the number of retransmissions can be further increased.
Erroneous bytes had a tendency of appearing at the end of the messages, indicating
flow problems in the buffers of the RS-422 interface. However, the number of errors
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increased with higher voltage of the transients. Thus, byte errors can be considered
to be a consequence of both.
It is important to note that due to the limitations of the current prototype, the
tests were done with a transmission rate of 38.4 kbps instead of 115.2 kbps. With
increased speed the pulse width of the signal will be smaller, and the signal will be
less immune to the transient bursts. However, as the series of bursts are likely to
last only a couple of seconds, transmission errors due to transients will be quite rare
and can therefore be corrected with simple retransmissions.
7.3 Results of SI Analysis
Three groups of tests were conducted. In each group, a different cable length was
selected and the data link rate varied from 19.2 kbps to 115.2 kbps.
Table 7.9 shows the results of these tests. The pulse duration of the signal is included
in the table. If the jitter is very small compared to the duration of one bit, the
decision logic can easily decide the correct state of the bit and the signal integrity
is intact. In fact, as one can see in Figure 7.6, Figure 7.7, Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9
the jitter is so small compared to the bit duration that it was impossible to get a
screen shot of the entire eye and make an accurate measurement of the jitter at the
same time.
Transmission rate Total jitter vs. cable length Pulse duration
54 m 100 m 141 m
19.2 kbps 16 ns 36 ns 91 ns 52 µs
38.4 kbps 19 ns 39 ns 106 ns 26 µs
57.6 kbps 24 ns 43 ns 124 ns 17.4 µs
115.2 kbps 26 ns 46 ns 155 ns 8.7 µs
Table 7.9: Measurement of Total Jitter tTJ for different cable lengths and transmis-
sion speeds
Figure 7.6: Measurement of Total Jit-
ter with eye-diagram, cable length 141
m, transmission rate 19.2 kpbs.
Figure 7.7: Measurement of Total Jit-
ter with eye-diagram, cable length 141
m, transmission rate 38.4 kpbs.
Figure 7.10 shows the eye diagram for the case where the cable length is 141 m and
the transmission rate is 115.2.
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Figure 7.8: Measurement of Total Jit-
ter with eye-diagram, cable length 141
m, transmission rate 57.6 kpbs.
Figure 7.9: Measurement of Total Jit-
ter with eye-diagram, cable length 141
m, transmission rate 115.2 kpbs.
Figure 7.10: Eye-diagram with cable length 141 m and transmission rate 115.2 kbps
7.3.1 Discussion of Results
From the measurements of the jitter and by looking at the eye diagram one can
safely conclude that the jitter is negligible. This means that the current setup of
the RS-422 serial interface is well chosen for the defined transmission parameters.
There is significant overshoot appearing in the eye diagram. However, it does not
affect the signal integrity and is most likely coming from the output driver of the
RS-422 link. There will be no need to improve the configuration of the cables or to
change the hardware as the length of the cables will not significantly degrade the
signal integrity. The performed tests confirmed the initial expectations.
7.4 Results of Endurance Run and Reliability Tests
Table 7.10 and Table 7.11 show the validated requirements for the front end software.
Some of the requirements in Table 7.10 could not be validated due to the fact that
the functionality was not implemented in the current prototype of the FMCM. The
priorities of the different messages were not validated as this would require access
to the FIFO queue in the scheduler. The scheduler is automatically generated by
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Required Functionality FMCM (FPGA version 7) Front end software Validated
The status command
and message
× × ∨
The update UTC com-
mand and message
× × ∨
The PM command
and message
× × ∨
The idle command and
message
× × ∨
The reset alarm
counter command and
message
× × ∨
The simulate dump
command and message
× × ∨
If the FMCM receives
undefined data, it an-
swers with ’?’
Timeout if command is
not finished after 0.2
seconds
×
Four types of PM data:
U Mag, I Sim Diff,
I Diff DCCT and
U Ext
× × ∨
Transmission speed
115.2 kbps
× ∨
Command checksum × × ∨
Response checksum × ∨
Time-stamp of last
PM acquisition
× ∨
Current time-stamp × × ∨
Table 7.10: Validated requirements for the front end software
68 CHAPTER 7. RESULTS
Required Functionality Implemented Validated
The status command is sent twice ev-
ery second
× ∨
The update UTC command is sent
once every 30 second
× ∨
If the PM time-stamp changes, read-
out of the PM data will be requested
by the front end computer
× ∨
Transmission errors must be handled
by the front end software
× ∨
The PM command has 1st priority ×
The update UTC command has 2nd
priority
×
The simulate dump, reset alarm
counter and idle message have 3rd pri-
ority
×
Thestatus message has last priority ×
Table 7.11: Validated requirements for the front end software
the FESA framework and can not be directly influenced by the developer.
7.4.1 Error Handling
During the entire test-period of 48 hours there were no failed transmissions, see
Table 7.12. Every message was delivered within the given limit of retransmissions.
The retransmission frequency was in general quite high, but less for the messages
Message PM Idle Status Update UTC
Sent (in total) 721 91 346596 5825
Received 702 68 345494 5757
Retransmitted 19 23 1102 68
% Retransmitted 2.7 33.8 0.32 1.2
Failed 0 0 0 0
Table 7.12: Results of error handling during endurance run
sent most frequently. The highest percentage of retransmissions was encountered
with the idle message. The idle command was triggered through the FESA Test
Tool in two series. During the second test-period of 10 minutes, an idle message
was sent every now and then, and 58 commands were triggered in total. During the
EMC test 10 idle commands were sent consecutively.
The four graphs in Figure 7.11 shows the retransmissions frequency versus the num-
ber of received messages for the PM, idle, status and update UTC message. The
main characteristic found in this figure is the almost linear relationship between the
number of retransmissions and the number of received messages.
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Figure 7.11: Number of retransmissions versus the number of received messages
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Figure 7.12: Number of retransmissions as a function of time
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Figure 7.12 shows the number of retransmissions as a function of time. The shaded
area in the figure indicates the second test-period, and the area to the right is the
third test-period where a burst generator applied transients to the RS-422 interface.
The generation of retransmissions was monitored during the last two test-periods,
and the high retransmission frequency of the idle message can be clearly seen in
Figure 7.13.
Figure 7.13: Step plot showing the retransmissions of the idle messages generated
in the second test-period
The number of retransmissions was not affected by the applied burts during the
third test-period. However, a certain retransmission pattern was detected while
monitoring the status message, see Figure 7.14. During a period of 5 minutes the
status message was retransmitted quite frequently. However, besides these 5 minutes
there where hardly any retransmissions at all, indicating that this effect was not due
to the transient bursts.
Figure 7.14: Step plot showing the retransmissions of the status messages generated
during 5 minutes of the third test-period
7.4.2 Discussion of Results
Most of the requirements for the front end software are implemented. The imple-
mentations have been validated during the endurance run and other tests outlined
in this chapter. Missing functionality in the FPGA of the FMCM prototype and
the fact that there is only one prototype available, are the main reasons why some
of the initial requirements are not yet fulfilled.
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Even though the retransmission frequency was quite high in some cases, the imple-
mented error handling did not fail to deliver a single message. This was the main
requirement for the error handling. The high retransmission frequency has two pos-
sible explanations. Noise coming from other equipment installed in the same VME
crate could have interfered with the signal, or caused conflict in the front end com-
puter. However, a more likely explanation is unsynchronized triggering of commands
and conflicts in the scheduler.
The highest number of retransmissions was encountered with the idle message, which
was triggered via the FESA Test Tool. Delay caused by the server action and thus
unsynchronized triggering of the idle command with respect to the other commands
could have caused conflict. Further, problems with the timing might have led to
buffer overflow or underflow in the ring buffer managed by the driver. The front end
computer sends a command and waits a certain amount of time before it receives
the message returned from the FMCM. If the waiting period is too short, the buffer
in the driver does not have enough time to get filled, and the front end computer
will only see parts of the message, discard it and ask for a retransmission.
Two results indicate that events occurring regularly might provoke errors. There
was an almost linear relationship between the number of retransmissions and the
number of messages received. Moreover, during 5 minutes of the third test-period
the number of retransmitted status messages was very high but not due to the
applied noise. By looking at the graphs in Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12, it can be
assumed that short periods with high retransmission frequency occur on a regular
basis. These errors might be due to noise from other equipment or more likely,
unsynchronized triggering of commands.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This master’s thesis has focused on the software development and analysis of the
FMCM control interface. As indicated by extensive particle tracking studies and a
beam incident in the beam transfer line TT40 in the fall of 2004, the Fast Magnet
current Change Monitors will play an important role within the Machine Protection
systems of the LHC and its transfer lines. They will provide protection against fast
powering failures in the order of some 100 µs and the hardware design has been
carefully chosen to respond to the high demands in terms of reliability and safety of
the overall system.
The same stringent requirements apply for the design and development of the related
front-end and supervision software in order to guarantee continuous monitoring and
control over all devices related to equipment protection. The developments and
studies performed within this thesis will allow meeting the initial requirements for
the communication between the different FMCMs and the CERN’s control system,
namely to collect data acquired by each FMCM in case of an event and to provide
the required tools to machine operators to remotely supervise and fully exploit the
geographically distributed devices.
The communication between the FMCMs and the CERN control system has been
implemented in C++, following the guidelines given by the FESA framework. Tran-
sient bursts are considered to be the most common type of disturbance in the LHC
and the related surface buildings. Hence, error detection was implemented to ensure
reliable communication by causing retransmissions until the data has been correctly
received. The hardware related to the RS-422 interface has been integrated and
configured into the VME framework, using CERN standards for hardware and con-
figuration tools. Analysis were completed on the RS-422 interface with respect to
Signal Integrity, Electromagnetic Compatibility and reliability. Through these anal-
ysis the communication was validated in terms of the initial requirements based
on representative test-setups. Additional tests were done to validate the timing
interface of the FMCM prototype.
The EMC tests validated the current implementation of the RS-422 interface. It was
demonstrated that most errors are avoided with proper shielding of the cables. The
cable shield should be grounded on both sides of the connection. Further analysis of
the encountered errors during the EMC test indicated that a simple retransmission
scheme would be sufficient.
73
A second EMC test was done after the error handling procedure was implemented.
This test confirmed the results from the first EMC test. With proper shielding of
the cables no messages were lost, even with bursts of 4kV and the repetition rate
of the transients equal to 66 kHz. The only case where the transmission failed was
when the voltage was raised to 2 kV and the cable shield was not grounded on either
one side or both. The results from the second EMC test validated the implemented
error handling with respect to the main requirements.
A SI analysis was done on the RS-422 interface to reveal interference within the
system itself. The jitter measured by means of the signals eye diagram was found
to be negligible. This verified the current setup of the RS-422 serial interface for
the given transmission parameters. There was no need to improve the configuration
of the cables, and the length of the cables will not significantly degrade the signal
integrity.
Finally, an endurance run was performed as a final validation of the general require-
ments of the FMCM control interface. The different functionalities of the front end
software were tested and validated according to the initial requirements. The soft-
ware was running on a front end computer in a test laboratory for approximately
48 hours. Even though the retransmission frequency was quite high in some cases,
the implemented error handling did not fail to deliver a single message. This was
the main requirement for the error handling. The high retransmission frequency
is not yet fully understood, but is assumed to be related to the synchronization of
commands rather than disturbance coming from other equipment.
8.1 Future improvements
The high retransmission frequency found during the endurance run, will be studied
in further detail. A better understanding of the scheduler embedded in the FESA
framework will be necessary to improve the synchronization of commands and to
validate the priorities of the different commands.
Tests with four FMCMs connected to one single front end computer, with trans-
mission speed 115.2 kbps should be performed. This will require several FMCMs
to be operational. However, the communication from the front end computer to
the RS-422 interface can be tested by connecting four industrypack modules to the
VIPC626-ET industrypack carrier.
The possibility to retrieve PM data for more than one type of signal will be given.
The operator can then select if he or she wants PM data from all the signals or select
only one, two or three signals.
Currently, if a message is not received within the given limit of retransmissions, the
message will be discarded. A method must be implemented to handle the valid data
in the last message for diagnostic purposes.
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Appendix A
The RS-422 Serial Interface
EIA/TIA-422 is a telecommunications standard for binary serial communications
between devices. It is the protocol or specification that must be followed to allow
two devices that implement this standard to speak to each other. In this work
the standard is referred to as RS-422 (Recommended Standard 422). RS-422 is an
updated version of the original serial protocol known as RS-232.
A.1 The RS-422 Standard
With the invention of the microprocessor, logic design has become modular in con-
cept. In most cases the different modules are coupled quite close together on a single
printed circuit board, connected to a standard bus. However, peripheral circuits can
also be physically separated from the main processor with data communication be-
ing handled over cables. When these cables are long, the wavelength of the digital
signals might become shorter than the electrical length of the cable and they must
be treated as transmission lines, see Section 6.3. Further, these signals are ex-
posed to electromagnetic noise sources which require greater noise immunity then
the single board systems. The RS-422 standard is especially developed to meet the
requirements of noise immunity when signaling over long cables up to 1.2 km.
Figure A.1: RS-422 Digital Interface Circuit [29]
Figure A.1 shows the digital interface for the RS-422 circuit. The driver circuit
should result in a low impedance balanced voltage source that produces a differential
voltage in the range of 2V to 10V. The receiver shall not require a differential input
of more than 200 mV to correctly detect the intended binary state. The maximum
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differential voltage should be 6V. The reason for using the differential signal is to
eliminate the common-mode voltage. The common-mode voltage is the common
reference voltage for the two inputs of the driver and receiver interfaces, which
consists of the common ground potential and possibly noise. It is defined as the
algebraic mean of the two voltages appearing at the receiver input terminals with
respect to the receiver circuit ground.
Figure A.2: Common-Mode Voltage [30]
The controlling factors in a voltage digital interface are the cable length, the data
signal rate, the characteristic of the interconnection cable and the rise time of the
signal. The standard does not mention a maximum cable length, but guidelines are
given with respect to distance as a function of data signaling rate. Tolerable signal
distortion can be guaranteed for maximum cable length of about 1.2 km with data
signaling rate up to 100 kbps. Above 100 kbps the length must be decreased with
increased signaling rate to maintain the same signal quality. The maximum cable
length is also influenced by the amount of common-mode voltage, ground potential
differences between driver and load and cable termination.
The standard recommends that the balanced voltage digital interface will be utilized
on data, timing or control circuits where the data signaling rate on these circuits is
below 10 Mbps. As long as the interface meets the electrical characteristics of the
standard, they can be designed to operate over narrower ranges to satisfy specific
applications.
The characteristics of the interconnecting cable should result in a transmission line
with a characteristic impedance in the range of 100Ω for frequencies greater than
100 kHz. The cable may be composed of twisted or untwisted pair and is not further
specified in the standard.
The signal rise time is a high frequency component which causes interference to
be coupled to adjacent channels in the interconnecting cable. A major cause of
distortion is the affect the transmission line has on the rise time of the transmitted
signal. Attenuation and delay of the pulses increases with the length of the cable.
[29, 31, 30]
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A.2 Setup of the RS-422 Serial Interface
A schematic overview of the RS-422 interface is shown in Figure A.3.
Figure A.3: Communication chain between the FMCM and the front end computer
A.2.1 The VME Crate and the Front End Computer
The Versa Module Eurocard (VME) standard defines an interfacing system for
interconnecting microprocessors, data storage and peripheral control devices in a
closely coupled hardware configuration. Eurocard is a European standard format
for Printed Circuit Boards (PCB). A VME crate has 21 slots for inserting different
modules all following the Eurocard standard, and the first slot is dedicated to a
crate manager. Every module can be viewed as an address, or block of addresses
and is connected through the VME bus which is a Transistor-Transistor Logic (TTL)
based backplane. The system allows communication between devices on the VME
bus without disturbing the internal activities of other devices interfaced to the bus.
The VME bus system consists of 4 sub-buses: the Data Transfer Bus, the Arbitra-
tion Bus, the Priority Interrupt Bus and the Utility Bus. The data transfer bus
allows masters to direct the transfer of binary data between themselves and the
slaves. [32, 33]
Figure A.4: The VME crate with the front end computer in slot 1 and a VIPC626-ET
card with mezzanine IP-IOCTALPLUS422 in slot 20
In the current project a VME64 is used and the module in slot one is the front
end computer which also serves as the crate manager. The front end computer
is a LynxOs PowerPC 4.0.0, and is the master of communication whereas as the
VIPC626-ET card in slot 20 is the slave. The data transfer bus supports 64-bit
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data transfers in multiplexed and non multiplexed form. The transfer protocols are
asynchronous with varying degrees of handshaking depending on the speed required.
The available bandwidth is 80 Mbytes per second.
A.2.2 VMEbus Industrypack Carrier VIPC626-ET
The VIPC626-ET is a VMEbus Industrypack Carrier used to build modular I/O
solutions for applications in process control, medical systems, telecommunication
and traffic control. Carrier boards have slots for other modules. The VIPC626-
ET is a non-intelligent carrier device, or slave, that connects the modules via a
bus bridge to the VME bus. It can connect to four single-sized or two doubled
size Industrypack (IP) modules [34]. The IP module chosen for the FMCM control
interface is the IP-OCTALPLUS422.
Figure A.5: VMEbus Industrypack Carrier VIPC626-ET
A.2.3 Industrypack Module IP-OCTALPLUS422
Mezzanine modules allow for customization of a VME board to meet specific applica-
tion requirements. The IP-OCTALPLUS422 interface is an IP compatible module
providing eight channels for the serial RS-422 interface. Each channel has a 64
byte FIFO for both transmitting and receiving data. The transmission rate is pro-
grammable up to 460.8 kbps. The most important component of the IP module is
the Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter (UART).
The UART translates data between parallel and serial interfaces. It converts bytes
of date to and from asynchronous bit streams. Each byte is encapsulated by a start
bit and a stop bit which synchronizes the stream with the internal clock of the
UART and indicate that the next eight bits must be read and handled as one byte.
The bits are binary electrical pulses according to the RS-422 standard. The serial to
parallel conversion is handled by shift-registers. The basic components of a UART is
the clock-generator, I/O shift registers, transmit/receive control, read/write control
logic and a FIFO buffer. The UART can perform parity checking to ensure correct
transmission. In this case the transmission of one character requires 11 bits in total.
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The UART used by the IP-IOCTALPLUS422 is ST16C654D from EXAR, which
actually is a concatenation of four UARTS. Each of them is independently controlled
having its own set of device configuration registers. In addition, each UART channel
has a 64 bytes FIFO buffer for both transmit and receive, flow control, handling of
special characters and a programmable baud rate up to 1.5 Mbit/s [35, 36].
Figure A.6: Industrypack module IP-IOCTALPLUS422
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Appendix B
Installations
Due to hardware differences in the LHC accelerator infrastructure, two different
installation strategies had to be chosen for the FMCM in the LHC and the transfer
lines, see Figure B.1 and Figure B.2. In the LHC, the front end computers are placed
in the VME crate situated in the same rack as the corresponding Beam Interlock
Controller (BIC) of the Beam Interlock System. In the transfer lines the front end
computers are placed in the VME crates of the power converters (MUGEF).
Timing signals required for the synchronization of the internal clock of the FMCM,
and the PM trigger are received from a TG8 timing card in the transfer lines and
from a CTRP timing card in the LHC. The user interface with the Beam Interlock
System, the CIBU is in both cases installed in the same location as the FMCM. The
installation of the RS-422 interface is as described in Appendix A.2.
In the case where the BIC is in the same location as the power converter, the voltage
across the magnets will be picked up at the power converter terminals. In the other
cases, where the where power converters are in the surface buildings and the BIC
is in the underground area, the voltage across the magnets will be picked up at the
magnet terminals.
Figure B.1: Installation of the FMCM
in the transfer lines
Figure B.2: Installation of the FMCM
in the LHC
Figure B.3 and Figure B.4 show the distribution of FMCMs along the LHC and the
transfer lines, both underground and in the corresponding surface buildings.
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Figure B.3: FMCMs situated underground in the LHC
Figure B.4: FMCMc situated in the surface buildings of the LHC and the transfer
lines
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Appendix C
Front End Software
Architecture (FESA)
FESA is a comprehensive framework whereby front-end software is to be
designed, developed, deployed and maintained according to the standards
of the Accelerator and Beams (AB) department at CERN. [37]
The purpose of the framework is to make consistent rules for how front end software
should be implemented for equipment used by the Accelerator and Beams depart-
ment at CERN. The Front End Section in the AB department is responsible for
the development and maintenance of the FESA framework, and they offer different
tools which are helpful throughout the development process. These tools are Java
applications which are available on the FESA Homepage. The Design Tool is used
to prepare a model of the equipment software, where one defines the most important
equipment parameters, their dependencies and the program flow. The model is then
converted from the original XML format into a C++ project. The developer must
then implement the required functionality and establish the connection between
the front end computer and the device. With a well defined equipment model the
programming should be simplified. The Deployment Tool is used to deploy FESA
equipment classes on a front end computer. The Instantiation Tool is used for in-
stantiating devices of a given equipment class on a specific front end computer. The
Test Tool is used to access the device while the software is running.
The Equipment model defines some Properties, Server Actions and Real-time Ac-
tions, User Events and Timer Events, which together reflect the system specifications
and decide the software structure.
A property is a collection of data-fields that holds information about the device. A
data-field can belong to several properties.
A priori, the only part of the software that the developer needs to implement is the
executable functions of the different actions. A real-time action is an action that
is fully managed by the front end computer. A server action on the other hand is
triggered by an operator request via the FESA server.
A real-time action is always triggered by an event. The most common type of event
is the timer event, which is nothing else than a timer. One can set the timer event
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to trigger a RT action e.g. every 5 ms. The user event is defined by software
and can be used to trigger a RT action anywhere, anytime with the function call
fireUserEvent().
A property is either of type Set or Get and every action is linked to a property. A
Get property is usually linked to a RT action and when a RT action is executed
it updates the data-fields of this property. In fact a RT action can be linked to
several properties. When the software is running the operator can subscribe to the
different properties via the FESA Test Tool to see the content of the data-fields. A
Set property is usually linked to a server action. When the software is running, the
operator can set a property in the Navigator application and this will trigger the
server action.
C.1 The FESA Design Process for the FMCM Control
Interface
Based on the flowchart in Figure 4.4, an equipment model was designed using the
FESA Design Tool, see Figure C.1. The equipment model is shown in Figure C.2,
Figure C.3, Figure C.4 and Figure C.5.
Figure C.1: The Fesa Design Tool
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Figure C.2: Equipment model
Figure C.3: Equipment model contin-
ued (1)
Figure C.4: Equipment model contin-
ued (2)
Figure C.5: Equipment model contin-
ued (3)
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When the equipment model was converted into a C++ project and the implementa-
tion was finished, the program was installed in the relevant front end computer with
the right configuration. For this the Fesa Deployment Tool was used, see Figure C.6.
In this case the software was deployed on a front end computer named ppccodv1
which was used for test-purposes.
Figure C.6: The Fesa Deployment Tool
To instantiate the different equipment on a single front end the Fesa Instantiation
Tool was used, see Figure C.7. Using this tool one can set the timing for the events
defined in the equipment model, and define the parameters that are constant during
operation of the device like equipment-id, hardware-id and the name of the device.
For initial testing only one instance of the FMCM was connected to the front end
computer ppccodv1.
When the program is running it is possible to monitor the properties and the be-
longing data in the Fesa Test Tool. In Figure C.8 one can see the values of the
response header belonging to a update UTC message. The data fields shown at the
bottom of the page are hexadecimal numbers, whereas the data fields at the top of
the page are decimal numbers and one field corresponds to one byte of information.
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Figure C.7: The Fesa Instantiation Tool
Figure C.8: The Fesa Test Tool
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Appendix D
Test of the FMCM Timing
Interface
As a new prototype of the FMCM arrived in end of January 2007, it was necessary
to perform tests to validate the prototype. One of these tests aimed to verify the
behavior of the FMCM timing interface.
The timing interface is shortly described in Section 4.1.2. In Section 4.1.2 a CTRP
card is responsible for a PM trigger signal which indicates an external event in the
LHC, and the pps signal which synchronizes the internal clock in the FMCM with
the timing of the LHC machine. However, in the transfer lines an older version of
this card is used, which is called TG8. The timing interface must be tested for both
versions. It is also interesting to see the effect of the length of the cable between the
TG8/CTRP and the FMCM. In the current version of the FMCM the internal clock
is synchronized to the pps only on arrival of the UTC time stamp (every 30 second).
This test will verify if this solution is adequate or if the UTC time stamp should
be refreshed more often. A solution could also be to increase the rate at which the
internal clock is synchronized with the timing of the LHC machine, independently
of how often UTC time stamp is updated. In the extreme case one could try to
synchronize on every pulse or every other pulse instead of every 30 pulse.
The internal clock in the FMCM oscillates at 12 MHz with an accuracy of 100 parts
per million (ppm). The length of one pulse is approximately 83 ns. In the worst
case, during one second the oscillator may encounter a drift of 1200 pulses, which is
equivalent to 100 µs. After 30 seconds the drift would be about 3 ms.
The specification of the cable, a coaxial cable with 50 Ohm characteristic impedance,
states that the rated delay is 5.03 ns per meter. In this test a 103 meter long cable
was used, and one could therefore expect a delay of 518 ns in the worst case.
The measurements were done on an oscilloscope with channel one being the pps
timing signal taken from the input of the FMCM after the signal had gone through
the cable. Channel two was pps signal taken directly from the output of the timing
card. Channel four was the same signal taken from within the FMCM after the
opto-coupler, which will serve as input for the FPGA, see Figure D.1.
The tests with the CTRP card, see Figure D.2, Figure D.3 and Figure D.4, verified
that nor the length of the cable, nor the circuits in the FMCM contribute significantly
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Figure D.1: Schematics of the timing interface of the FMCM. The different signals
analyzed on the oscilloscope are shown, with the numbers corresponding to the
incoming channels on the oscilloscope.
to the total delay of the timing system. The inaccuracy of the 12 MHz oscillator
is still the biggest issue and the total delay is 100.1µs. One could also see that
when the cable is not terminated with the 50 Ohm resistor the signals were clearly
distorted.
Figure D.2: Test with CTRP card. The cable was terminated with a 50 Ohm
resistor. The light blue signal (channel 2) is the pps signal coming directly from the
CTRP card. The dark blue signal (channel 1) is the same signal on the other side
of the 104 m long cable. The delay due to the cable is approximately 485 ns.
The test with the TG8 card, see Figure D.5, Figure D.6 and Figure D.7, confirms the
result of the test with the CTRP card. That was as expected. The delay of the cable
and the decision logic in the FMCM was of course the same, but one could clearly
see that correct termination of the cable was even more crucial in combination with
the TG8 card.
Having a delay of 100 µs of each pulse, means that after 30 seconds or 30 pulses the
drift will be about 3 ms. This is too much. As the values of the PM data are recorded
during a short period of 40 ms the belonging time stamp will be rather inaccurate.
These tests have established the fact that the internal clock of the FMCM causes
the most significant delay. A digital Phase Locked Loop (PLL) would improve the
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Figure D.3: Test with CTRP card with the cable not being terminated. The light
blue signal (channel 2) is the pps signal coming directly from the CTRP card. The
dark blue signal (channel 1) is the same signal on the other side of the 104 m long
cable. Both signals were distorted.
Figure D.4: This is the same image as in Figure D.2 except for the green signal
(signal in the middle, channel 4) which is the signal after the opto-coupler. The
FMCM triggered the signal on 1.7 V, which gave a delay of approximately 300 ns.
accuracy of the oscillator with a factor of 20. Thus, the maximum drift of the internal
clock in the FMCM would be about 5 µs during one second. This means that if a
maximum drift of 50 µs was desired, the refresh rate of the UTC time stamp should
be 10 seconds. Another possible solution is to synchronize the oscillator with the
pps signal from the timing card more often. This is something that will be discussed
with the responsible at DESY. It is important to note that this measurements are
based on a worst case scenario, and further tests should be done to measure the
average drift of the oscillator.
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Figure D.5: Test with TG8 card. The cable is terminated with a 50 Ohm resistor.
The light blue signal (channel 2) is the pps signal coming directly from the CTRP
card. The dark blue signal(channel 1) is the same signal on the other side of the 104
m long cable. The delay due to the cable is approximately 485 ns.
Figure D.6: Test with TG8 card and non-terminated cable. The light blue signal
(channel 2) is the pps signal coming directly from the CTRP card. The dark blue
signal (channel 1) is the same signal on the other side of the 104 m long cable. Both
signals are distorted.
Figure D.7: This is the same image as in Figure D.5 except for the green signal
(signal in the middle, channel 4) which is the signal after the opto-coupler. The
FMCM triggers the signal on 1.7 V, which gives a delay of approximately 300 ns.
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